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SURVEY ARTICLES

Business Associations
by Paul A. Quirds*
Lynn Schutte Scott**
and
Gregory M. Bel***
This Article surveys noteworthy cases that the Georgia Appellate
Courts, the United States District Courts in Georgia, and the United
States Court of Appeals decided during the survey period1 as they relate
to Georgia corporate, partnership, securities, and banking laws. It also

* Partner in the firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia.
Furman University (B.A., 1979); Mercer University (JD., 1982). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1980-1982); Lead Articles II Editor (1981-1982). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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*** Associate in the firm of Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Atlanta,
Georgia. University of Alabama (B.S., 1990). University of Miami (J.D., 1995). Member,
University of Miami Law Review (1993-1995). Member, State Bar of Alabama.
1. The survey period is June 1, 1995 through May 31, 1996. The authors would like
to thank Scott O'Melia, Esq., an associate in the firm of Nelson Mullins Riley &
Scarborough, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article.
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highlights certain enactments by the Georgia General Assembly revising
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.
A.

CORPORATIONS

Piercing the CorporateVeil

The concept of piercing the corporate veil to hold shareholders
personally liable for the debts of the corporation has been used by the
Georgia courts in an attempt to remedy fraud or injustice.2 The courts,
however, have failed to define precise standards to apply to rather
predictable factual scenarios. Consequently, the results of appellate
review often seem contradictory and confused; therefore, parties who are
unsuccessful at the trial court level often find it is worth the expense of
an appeal to test the law on the veil-piercing issue.'
Georgia courts generally frame the issue as whether or not the
corporation is the alter ego or business conduit of its owner.4 The
principal inquiry is not the composition of corporate ownership or control
because, under Georgia law, a corporation and its shareholders or
officers are distinct entities, even if the corporation is wholly owned and
controlled by an individual.'
To establish a successful claim to pierce a corporate veil, the plaintiff
must show that the shareholder's disregard of the corporate entity made
it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of the shareholder's own
affairs; that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation and the owner or officer no
longer exist; and that to adhere to the doctrine of a separate corporate
entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.' For the issue to be
submitted to a jury, Georgia courts require evidence that the corporate
arrangement is a sham used to defeat justice, to perpetuate fraud, or to
evade statutory, contractual, or tort responsibility.7

2. See, e.g., Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991).

3. See Paul A. Quir6s & Gregory M. Beil, BusinessAssociations, 47 MERCER L. REV. 41,
42-48 (1995); Paul A. Quir6s & Lynn Scott Magruder, Business Associations, 43 MERCER
L. REV. 85, 86-94 (1991).
4. See, e.g., J & J Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 446 S.E.2d
781 (1994); Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 401 S.E.2d 738 (1991); Darbyshire v. United
Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 392 S.E.2d 37 (1990); Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga.
App. 320, 367 S.E.2d 107 (1988).
5. International Telecommunications Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,
892 F. Supp. 1520, 1551-52 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (quoting United States v. Fidelity Capital
Corp., 920 F.2d 827, 837 (11th Cir. 1991)).

6. See cases cited supra notes 4 and 5.
7. See cases cited supra notes 4 and 5.
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1. Veil-Piercing Theory Invoked to Hold Corporation Liable for
Acts of an Employee of its Sister Corporation which Disregarded
its Separate Corporate Identity. In Mark Six Realty Associates, Inc.
v. Drake,8 the Georgia Court of Appeals drew upon the alter ego prong
of veil-piercing theory and affirmed the lower court's decision to hold a
limited purpose corporation equally liable for the acts of an employee of
its sister corporation. Appellee, Lynn A. Drake ("Drake") won a
favorable jury verdict against Mark Six Realty Associates, Inc. ("Mark
Six"), formerly known as Northside Realty Associates, Inc. ("Associates,
Inc."), Northside Realty, Inc. ("Northside Realty"), and five other
defendants. Among other things, Drake alleged breach of contract,
negligence, and breach of warranty in connection with her purchase of
a new home.9 The case stemmed in part from the actions of a real
estate agent, Matsis, who the trial court found was acting as an
employee of Associates, Inc. Northside Realty, Inc., appealed the lower
court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
contending that the lower court erred in denying its motion because
Northside Realty was a separate and distinct corporation from its sister
corporation, Associates, Inc.'" The appellate court disagreed and
affirmed the lower court's denial."
After the events giving rise to Drake's action, Associates, Inc. changed
its corporate name to Mark Six Realty Associates, Inc. Northside Realty
was formed as a separate corporation, although it did share common
owners, a common address, and some duplication of corporate officers
and directors with its sister corporation, Associates, Inc. Testimony from
the president of Associates, Inc., who was also the executive vice
president of Northside Realty, indicated that Northside Realty was
created "specifically to hold the active licenses of [real estate] agents who
were not active as agents for the status purpose of the Georgia Real
Estate Commission." 2
Agents whose licenses were assigned to
Northside Realty worked under contracts with Northside Realty that
specifically prohibited them from being "active in the real estate
business other than to refer customers" to Associates, Inc. 3 The
evidence indicated that Northside Realty's sole purpose was to circumvent regulations of the Georgia Real Estate Commission that required

8. 219 Ga. App. 57, 463 S.E.2d 917 (1995).

9. Id. at 57, 463 S.E.2d at 918-19.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 62, 463 S.E.2d at 922.
12. Id. at 59, 463 S.E.2d at 920.
13. Id. at 60, 463 S.E.2d at 920.
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these agents either to sit for a relicensing exam or to pay to keep their
real estate licenses active.14
Northside Realty argued that because it neither had employees nor
operated as a business, it could not take action on its own behalf to enter
into a contract, to mislead, or to confuse its name and business with that
of Associates, Inc. 5 The tone of the appellate court's decision indicates
that without more evidence that Northside Realty was merely the alter
ego of Associates, Inc., piercing the corporate veil to integrate the
separate identities of Associates, Inc. and Northside Realty may have
been inappropriate. However, the evidence before the trial court
indicated a level of disregard by Associates, Inc. of its separate corporate
identity that was sufficient to justify treating the sister corporations as
Generally, common ownership or
a common business enterprise.1
control is not a sufficient basis to integrate independent corporate
identities; however, this case had overtones drawing upon the business
conduit and evasion of contractual, statutory or tort justifications for
veil-piercing. 17 Thus, although not neatly confined to a discrete veilpiercing theory, this case demonstrates the importance of maintaining
the separate corporate identities of sister corporations under common
ownership and control.
The court was bound by a highly deferential standard of review in
reaching its decision on whether any evidence presented below supported
the jury's verdict when construed in a light most favorable to Drake, the
prevailing party." The appellate court explained:
[T]here was ... evidence that the name of Northside Realty, Inc. was
confused with that of [Associates, Inc.] by such actions as the general
use of an ambiguous name which could be that of either corporation,
the use of printed brochures containing the Northside Realty, Inc.
name, and the use of "Northside Realty, Inc." in several written
agreements [used by Matsis, the agent-employee of Associates, Inc.].
We cannot say that any of these facts, standing alone, would constitute
sufficient evidence to put to the jury the question of Northside Realty,
Inc.'s liability either as a member of a common business enterprise, or
as the alt'er ego or business conduit of [Associates, Inc.]. But taken as
a whole, we likewise cannot say that no evidence exists to support the
jury's verdict or that the evidence demands a verdict in favor of
Northside Realty, Inc. on this issue. 9
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id., 463 S.E.2d at 920-21.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
219 Ga. App. at 58, 463 S.E.2d at 919.
Id. at 62, 463 S.E.2d at 922.
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The foregoing statement by the court recognizes that the concept of
piercing the corporate veil to hold sister corporations jointly and
severally liable is not neatly confined to a single veil-piercing theory or
justification. A judicial integration of veil-piercing theories to produce
new and distinct justifications for piercing the corporate veil would help
courts evaluate whether the veil-piercing issue was properly submitted
to a jury and would lend more certainty to a party considering appeal of
an unsuccessful claim.
2. Corporate Veil Pierced on Fraud or Abuse Grounds. In JMart Jewelry Outlets, Inc. v. Standard Design,' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that in an action brought by suppliers of a corporation
against the corporation and its major shareholders alleging joint and
several liability for open accounts, fraud, and racketeering, as ev'idenced
by theft and mail fraud, the question of whether or not to pierce the
corporate veil to reach the assets of a corporation's shareholders
constituted a jury question if evidence existed that shortly before the
corporation went out of business, the corporation paid off the balance on
a shareholder's personal credit card and made unauthorized payments
on the shareholder's car to the personal benefit of the shareholder.21
The defendants, Diamond Jim Halter ("Halter"), individually and d/b/a
Diamond Jim's Emporium, moved for a directed verdict on the veilpiercing issue. The trial court denied this motion based on sufficient
evidence of fraud and abuse of corporate form to submit the question of
whether to pierce the corporate veil to the jury. The jury, in turn,
pierced the corporate veil to find Halter individually liable for the
corporation's debts to certain suppliers. On appeal, Halter argued that
the evidence did not demonstrate the level of impropriety required to
submit the veil-piercing claim to the jury. The appellate court dismissed
Halter's contention, finding that Halter knowingly caused the corporation to pay his credit card bill eight days before the corporation ceased
business.22 The corporate check used to pay the bill was marked
"Payment in Full: Jim's Personal." 8 The evidence also established
that the corporation, knowing that it would soon go out of business,
purchased a new Cadillac for Halter's use and then transferred title to
him for insufficient consideration.24

20. 218 Ga. App. 459, 462 S.E.2d 406 (1995).
21. Id. at 460-61, 462 S.E.2d at 407-08.

22. Id. at 461, 462 S.E.2d at 408.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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In Pope v. Professional Funding Corp.,2 Professional Funding
Corporation ("PFC") purchased the accounts receivable of Total Care,
Inc. ("TCI"). PFC brought suit against TCI and its shareholders, alleging
conversion and breach of contract. 6 TCI shareholders and its financial
manager, Lonnie Pope ("Pope"), appealed from judgments entered on
jury verdicts against them. The jury pierced TCI's corporate veil to hold
related entities and their owners, including Pope, personally liable for
over $100,000 for TCI's failure to repurchase certain uncollected
accounts receivable pursuant to its contract with PFC." The Georgia
Court of Appeals found that the evidence supported the jury's decision
to pierce the corporate veil.2"
Pope helped establish TCI as part of a business providing medical and
chiropractic services to patients. TCI's two major shareholders, Drs.
Ron Clark ("Clark") and Jose Arroyo ("Arroyo"), jointly owned with Pope
two related corporations-Total Imaging Center, Inc. and Quantum I R
Imaging, Inc. Pope, Clark, and Arroyo were also partners in CAP
Realty, a partnership which owned and managed the building from
which all three corporations operated. Clark, the president of TCI,
testified that he, Pope, and Arroyo established TCI, the other two
corporations, and CAP Realty to handle various aspects of their clinical
business, and that they "'transferred money back and forth between
[their separate businesses] as needed' without supporting documentation."29 Although CAP Realty owned the building, TCI paid for
improvements, and when Pope, Clark, and Arroyo sold the building, they
realized a profit.3 °
The court of appeals decided that Clark's damning testimony
sufficiently foreclosed Pope from complaining that the jury's determination to disregard the corporate entity was improper. 3' The court
commented that "in light of the admitted lack of documentation, the jury
could infer from Clark's testimony that [TCI's shareholders] 'bled' the
company to fund other business enterprises, including CAP Realty."32
Accordingly, "[w]ith the artificial barriers between those entities fallen,

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

221 Ga. App. 552, 472 S.E.2d 116 (1996).
Id. at 552, 472 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 552-53, 472 S.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 553, 472 S.E.2d at 118.
Id.
Id. at 552, 472 S.E.2d at 117.18.
Id. at 553-54, 472 S.E.2d at 118.
Id. at 554, 472 S.E.2d at 118.
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Pope's partnership-and therefore Pope personally 33 -[was] held liable
for [TCI's] business debts."34
3. Bankruptcy Court Finds that Bankruptcy Trustee has
Standing to Bring Action Against Debtor Corporation. In Moore
v. Kumer,"5 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Georgia found that a trustee in bankruptcy had standing to
bring an alter ego action against entities sharing common ownership
with the debtor corporation to recover property of the bankruptcy estate
that was allegedly fraudulently or preferentially transferred to such
entities and their principals. Recognizing that state law governs causes
of action that may be asserted by a bankruptcy trustee concerning
property of the estate, the court examined Georgia law but found no
unequivocal support for the trustee's right to assert the claim at bar.36
Nonetheless, upon examining the equitable nature of an alter ego claim,
as well as Georgia case law in the area, the court found that the trustee
had standing to pursue its alter ego claim.37
When state law allows a subsidiary corporation to bring an alter ego
action against its parent corporation, or when a corporation may assert
the claim against its own principals, the bankruptcy trustee has the
same rights as the debtor corporation, and therefore has standing to
bring an alter ego action on behalf of the debtor corporation against its
parent or principals.3 " On the other hand, if state law does not permit
an alter ego action by a corporation against its parent or principals, then
the trustee lacks standing to bring the claim because the trustee only
succeeds to the rights that the debtor corporation holds.3 9 The bank-

33. See O.C.G.A. § 14-8-15 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (partners are jointly and severally

liable for debts of the partnership subject to 1995 amendment exceptions).
34. 221 Ga. App. at 554, 472 S.E.2d at 118.
35. 191 B.R. 249 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996).
36. Id. at 254.
37. Id. at 254-55.
38. Id. at 254 (citing S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv,, 817 F.2d 1142,
1152 (5th Cir. 1987) (Texas law permits a subsidiary to bring an alter ego action against
its parent). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 703
(2d Cir. 1989) (Ohio law allows same); Steyr-Daimler-Puch of America Corp. v. Pappas, 852
F.2d 132, 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (Virginia law allows a corporation to assert an alter ego claim
against its principals); Koch Ref. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc., 831 F.2d 1339, 134546 (7th Cir. 1987) (Indiana and Illinois law also allow an alter ego action by a corporation
against its principals), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 (1988).
39. 191 B.R. at 254. See also Mixon v. Anderson (In re Ozark Restaurant Equip. Co.),
816 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Jacoway v. Anderson, 484 U.S.
848 (1987) (a corporation may not pierce its own corporate veil in Arkansas because alter
ego actions are vested in third parties).
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ruptcy court found, however, that "Georgia law lacks unequivocal
statutory or binding judicial determination that a corporation may
entertain an action against its own parent or principals."40 Despite this
holding, the court commented that Georgia law concerning the alter ego
doctrine is similar to the laws of states that allow a corporation to bring
an action against its parent or principals.4 1
The alter ego doctrine was defined by the Georgia Supreme Court in
Farmers Waterhouse of Pelham, Inc. v. Collins 2 as a disregard by the
stockholders of the corporate entity which creates "such a unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation
and the owners no longer exist" so that adherence to the corporate entity
"would promote injustice or protect fraud."' In Stamps v. Knobloch
City Communications, Ltd.," the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Georgia determined that under Georgia law, an
alter ego claim is property of the bankruptcy estate. Given the
similarity of the Georgia courts' definition of the alter ego doctrine to the
definitions of those states that have allowed a corporation to assert an
alter ego claim against its parent or principals, 45 the bankruptcy court
possibly refined Georgia's alter ego doctrine and veil-piercing theory
outside the bankruptcy context by allowing the bankruptcy trustee to
pursue an alter ego claim against the parent and principals of the debtor
corporation."
The court recognized that "'[ iut may seem strange to allow a corporation to pierce its own veil, since it cannot claim to be either a creditor
that was deceived or defrauded by the corporate fiction, or an involuntary creditor [i.e., a successful tort claimant].'"' 7 But in some states,
piercing the corporate veil and alter ego claims are allowed to stand to
prevent inequitable results." Moreover, other states have defined the
alter ego doctrine as the Georgia Supreme Court defined it in Farmers
Warehouse of Pelham to allow corporations to sue their parents or
principals. 49

40.
41.

191 B.R. at 254.
Id. (quoting Stamps v. Knobloch City Communications, Ltd., 105 B.R. 1018, 1022

(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)).
42. 220 Ga. 141, 137 S.E.2d 619 (1964).
43. Id. at 150, 137 S.E.2d at 625.
44. 105 B.R. 1018, 1022 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).

45. 191 B.R. at 254.
46. Id. at 257.
47. Id. at 254 (quoting Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.20
(3d Cir. 1984)).

48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Farmers Waterhouse of Pelham, 220 Ga. at 150, 137 S.E.2d at 625).
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The Georgia Supreme Court in Farmers Waterhouse ofPelham refined
the alter ego doctrine to allow a corporation to bring an action against
its parent or principals; further refinement of the alter ego doctrine is
needed in the veil-piercing arena.
B. Successor Liability: Successor CorporationLiable for Debts of
PredecessorPartnership
In Pet Care Professional Center, Inc. v. BellSouth Advertising &
PublishingCorp., the court of appeals reminded Georgia lawyers that
complete continuity of ownership is not required for a successor
corporation to be held liable for the debts and obligations of its
predecessor business entity.5 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's judgment and held that a corporation, Pet Care
Professional Center, Inc. ("Pet Care"), was a successor in interest to its
predecessor partnership, Pet Care Professional Center ("Center"), and
was therefore liable for the debts of Center.52 BellSouth Advertising &
Publishing Corporation ("BellSouth") brought an action for breach of
contract or, in the alternative, quantum meruit to recover amounts due
under a contract for yellow-page advertising services provided to Center.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of BellSouth. Pet
Care's responsive pleading asserted that Center, not Pet Care, acted as
the contractual party to the BellSouth contract; therefore, Pet Care was
not responsible for the contractual liabilities of Center.5"
Pet Care was incorporated by three of the four partners of Center
about one month after Center executed the BellSouth contract. After
incorporation, Pet Care refused to pay sums owed to BellSouth for
advertising provided to Center. Pet Care argued on appeal that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of BellSouth on the
contract claim because "complete identity of ownership [was] required
[for] a corporation ...

to be deemed a successor in interest to a

predecessor entity."54 The appellate court disagreed, citing and quoting
cases on the common-law continuation-theory justification for successor
liability, which provides that a successor corporation may be liable for

50. 219 Ga. App. 117, 464 S.E.2d 249 (1995).
51. Id. at 119, 464 S.E.2d at 251 (citing Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254 Ga. 283,
328 S.E.2d 726 (1985) and Cilurso v. Premier Crown Corp., 769 F. Supp. 372 (M.D. Ga.
1991)).
52. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 251.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 118, 464 S.E.2d at 250.
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the debts of its predecessor if the successor is a mere continuation of the
predecessor."
The uncontroverted evidence showed that Pet Care continued the
business of Center such that the assets of the two did not change.5"
The entities' names were substantially the same. Further, Pet Care
succeeded to Center's assets, as well as its utilities and other accounts.
All but one of Center's partners became a Pet Care shareholder, and as
the court noted, only some continued identity of ownership is required
to hold a successor corporation liable for the debts of its predecessor
business entity.57
C.

CorporateDissolution

1. Judicial Dissolution of Corporation for Deadlock of De
Facto Directors. Black v. Graham5" involved an action by a shareholder to dissolve a corporation on the basis of director deadlock. Under
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1430(2)(A), a superior court may dissolve a
corporation in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that the
directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, that
the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and that irreparable
ipjury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business
and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of the shareholders generally because of the deadlock.59
In this case, two fifty percent shareholders, Black and Graham, owned
a corporation. As sole and equal shareholders of the corporation, they
functioned as de facto directors."0 Graham filed a petition in the
Spalding County Superior Court to dissolve the corporation for, among
other things, director deadlock under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1430(2)(A).
The superior court appointed a custodian to run the day-to-day
operations of the corporation. 6 Thereafter, the court determined that
Black and Graham functioned as directors of the corporation and that
they were deadlocked, and therefore the corporation should be dissolved

55. Id. at 118-19, 464 S.E.2d at 250-51; (citing Johnson-Battle Lumber Co. v. Emanuel
Lumber Co., 33 Ga. App. 517, 517, 126 S.E. 861, 861-62 (1924) (common law continuation
theory), Bullington v. Union Tool Corp, 254 Ga. 283, 284, 328 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1985)
(continuation theory where there is some continued identity of ownership), and Cilurso v.
Premier Crown Corp., 769 F. Supp. 372, 374 (M.D. Ga. 1991)).
56. 219 Ga. App. at 118, 464 S.E.2d at 250-51.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 119, 464 S.E.2d at 251. See cases cited supra note 55.
266 Ga. 154, 464 S.E.2d 814 (1996).
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1430(2)(A) (1994).
266 Ga. at 155, 464 S.E.2d at 815.
Id.
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because of the lack of cooperation between Black and Graham and its
probable irreparable harm to the corporation.62 The superior court
ordered that within one week of receiving an appraisal of the value of
the corporation, Black and Graham would each have to submit a sealed
bid for the other's stock.' The court also directed the custodian to
accept the high bid, with the successful bidder paying the purchase price
If neither shareholder made a bona fide
for the stock immediately.'
offer, or for any reason the stock purchase could not be completed, then
the court would designate the custodian as the receiver of the corporation and dissolve the corporation in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 142-1432.65 After the shareholders failed to complete the stock sale, the
superior court converted the custodianship into a receivership and
directed the receiver to liquidate the corporation.'
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's
order and found that Black and Graham were deadlocked and that the
deadlock would harm the corporation:
A deadlock occurs "[w]here stock of [a] corporation is owned in equal
shares by two contending parties, which condition threatens to result
in destruction of business, and it appears that [the] parties cannot
agree upon management of [the] business, and under existing
circumstances neither one is authorized to impose its views upon the
other...
Black and Graham functioned as de facto directors of the corporation
who could not agree on how to manage the business.6" Neither had
authority to impose his view on the corporation, and the "hostile and
static" situation threatened irreparable injury to the corporation. 69 The
supreme court found a "classic situation of deadlock" and affirmed the
superior court's orders.7"
2. Consequences of Corporate Dissolution: Administratively
Dissolved Corporation Could not Maintain its Previously Filed
Legal Malpractice Action. In Exclusive Properties,Inc. v. Jones,7

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Farrar v. Pesterfield, 216 Ga. 311, 314, 116 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1960)).

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id., 464 S.E.2d at 815-16.
71. 218 Ga. App. 229, 460 S.E.2d 562 (1995), cert. granted.
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the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a corporation could not maintain
a previously filed law suit against certain lawyers and their law firm for
legal malpractice because the corporation was administratively dissolved
while the lawsuit was pending. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1421(c) contains
the fundamental restriction on the activities of an administrativelydissolved corporation. 2 That section provides that an administrativelydissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry
on any business other than that business necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1405. 73
The trial court's record indicated that the plaintiff corporation had not
taken any steps toward winding up and liquidating after dissolution. 74
Further, the corporation never maintained that its legal malpractice suit
was necessary to wind up its business, but instead argued that it was
entitled to maintain its suit without a showing of necessity under
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1408(b). 7' The court readily dismissed the
corporation's assertion and stated that O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1408(b)
applies only to a voluntarily-dissolved corporation.76 Consequently,
without a showing by the corporation of the necessity of maintaining the
suit to wind up its affairs, the trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment for the defendants.77 The court also found that the
trial court did not err in refusing to allow the corporation to substitute
its shareholders as real parties in interest in the case because the
lawsuit did not constitute a corporate asset to which the shareholders
became entitled upon the administrative dissolution of the corporation.76
D. Imputation of Employee's Knowledge and Activities to the
Corporation
In United States v. Route 2, Box 472, 136 Acres More or Less,79 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the criminal
activity of an officer and majority shareholder of a corporation should be

72. Id. at 229,460 S.E.2d at 563 (quoting Gas Pump v. General Cinema Beverages, 263
Ga. 583, 583, 436 S.E.2d 207, 208 (1993)).
73. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1421(c) (1994)).
74. 218 Ga. App. at 230, 460 S.E.2d at 563.
75. Id.. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1408(b) provides in pertinent part that: "Upon filing of
articles of dissolution the corporation shall cease to exist., except for such actions as the
shareholders, directors, and officers take to protect any remedy, right, or claim on behalf
of the corporation. .. ." O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1408(b) (1994).
76. 218 Ga. App. at 230, 460 S.E.2d at 563-64.
77. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 564.
78. Id.
79. 60 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 1995).
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imputable to the corporation to deny the corporation an "innocent owner"
defense in a forfeiture action brought by the government. 80 The
defendant-real property was a tract of land (the "Land") owned by Dyer's
Trout Farms, Inc. (the "Corporation"). Government agents discovered
ninety-five marijuana plants growing near the residence of William Dyer
("Dyer"), the president and majority shareholder of the Corporation.
More plants were discovered next to Dyer's home, which was located on
part of the Land. Dyer admitted knowing about the plants next to his
house, but denied knowledge of the ninety-five plants on other parts of
the Land. In 1992, Dyer was convicted of marijuana possession. The
United States subsequently filed a complaint under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)
for forfeiture in rem against the Land on grounds that the Land was
used to facilitate drug trafficking."1
Dyer's father had incorporated the Corporation in 1976 primarily for
the raising and selling of fish and livestock. In 1978, Dyer's father
transferred the Land to the Corporation. Dyer acquired his stock in the
Corporation upon the death of his father. Dyer owned sixty-eight
percent of the stock and his, two brothers owned the remaining thirtytwo percent. All three brothers worked full time for the Corporation.82
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted summary judgment in favor of the government in its forfeiture
proceeding.83 The district court determined that the Corporation was
engaged exclusively in the business of raising and selling fish and
livestock and that it derived all of its income from that business.8 4 The
district court also found that the Corporation did not receive any benefit
from the cultivation of marijuana.85 Nonetheless, the district court
rejected the Corporation's innocent owner defense to forfeiture of the
Land because Dyer's ownership and control of the family-owned
Corporation sufficiently allowed imputation of knowledge of Dyer's
activities to the Corporation. 6
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district court's
analysis because "'other factors'" decreased the relevance of Dyer's stock
ownership and corporate control, and because sufficient weight was not
given to the innocent owner defense language contained in 21 U.S.C.

80. Id. at 1524.
81. Id. at 1525.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
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§ 881(a)(7).87 That section provides that "no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest by an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been
committed without the knowledge or consent of that owner."88
For the forfeiture action to stand under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), the
government had to establish probable cause to believe that a substantial
connection existed between the Land and Dyer's illicit activities.8 " The
Corporation conceded that probable cause existed, but argued that the
district court erred in rejecting the Corporation's innocent owner
defense." Thus, the appellate court was confronted with the issue of
whether Dyer's knowledge of illicit activity as an individual shareholder
of the Corporation was imputable to the Corporation.9 '
In finding that Dyer's knowledge could not be attributed to the
Corporation, the appellate court emphasized the government's failure to
establish that the Corporation had not always been run as a legitimate
enterprise, that the Corporation derived benefit from the cultivation of
marijuana, and that the other shareholders had knowledge of the illegal
activity on the Land.92 Knowledge of an illegal activity may only be
imputed to a corporation if the knowledge is obtained by an agent acting
within the scope of his employment and for the benefit of the corporation.9 3 The court commented that acting within the scope of employment entails more than merely being on a corporation's property; it also
involves an intent to benefit the corporation.94 "An individual's
knowledge of his own illegal activities, albeit pursued on corporate
property, will not be imputed to the corporation where the individual
was acting for his own benefit, not for the benefit of the corporation, and
outside the scope of his corporate employment.'
The court found that the district court placed too much weight on
Dyer's majority ownership of the Corporation." The court explained
that corporate knowledge generally is not determined by the percentage
of ownership held by the shareholder with knowledge of the illegal

87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 881(aX7) (1996)).
89. Id. at 1526 (citing United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 628

(11th Cir. 1986)).
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1526-27.
1527.
1527-28.
1527 (citing Grand Union Co. v. United States, 696 F.2d 888, 891 (11th Cir.

1983)).
94. Id. at 1528.
95. Id. at 1527.
96. Id.
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activity.9 7 The court's reasoning implies, however, that if it can be
shown that a corporation is merely a sham designed to hide an
individual shareholder's illicit activities, then corporate knowledge may
actually turn on that shareholder's percentage of ownership.98 The
court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of the government and remanded the case for entry of summary
judgment in favor of the Corporation.99
ShareholderInspection of CorporateRecords
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1602(c) empowers a shareholder to inspect
certain corporate records, such as minutes of board of directors and
shareholders' meetings, accounting records and shareholder records,
upon at least five business days' written notice of demand before the
planned inspection.' ° O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1602(d) provides further:

E.

A shareholder may inspect and copy [such] records ... only if: (1) His

demand is made in good faith and for a proper purpose that is reasonably relevant to his legitimate interest as a shareholder; (2) He
describes with reasonable particularity his purpose and the records he
desires to inspect; (3) The records are directly connected with his
purpose; 0and (4) The records are to be used only for the stated
purpose.' '
Trial courts have great discretion in determining whether a sharethe documents requested are
holder's purpose is proper and whether
10 2
relevant to the shareholder's purpose.
In G.I.R. Systems, Inc. v. Lance,'0 3 minority shareholder Grady
1 4
Lance ("Lance") brought suit against G.I.R. Systems, Inc. ("G.I.R.")

0

because G.I.R. refused to allow Lance to inspect certain shareholder,
accounting, and other corporate records in connection with an assessment of Lance's stock in GIR. 1' 5
Lance, a former officer and director of GIR, resigned from GIR in 1992"
and established a competing business. Lance owned thirty percent of
GIR's stock at the time of his demand for records, and Gorden Rehberg

97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id. at 1528.
100. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1602(c) (1994).
101. Id. § 14-2-1602(d).
102. G.I.R. Systems, Inc. v. Lance, 219 Ga. App. 829, 830, 466 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1995)
(citing Riser v. Genuine Parts Co., 150 Ga. App. 502, 505, 258 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1979)).

103. Id. at 830, 466 S.E.2d at 599.
104. Id. at 829, 466 S.E.2d at 598.
105. Id
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("Rehberg"), GIR's president, owned the remainder. Prior to Lance's
departure from GIR, Lance and Rehberg entered into a stock purchase
agreement (the "Agreement") wherein they stipulated that the fair
market value of GIR stock was $49.15 per share."° "The Agreement
also provided that in the absence of majority shareholder action, the
stock's value would automatically be adjusted in accordance with GIR's
earnings." No majority shareholder action was taken until 1994, and
Lance asserted the stock's value rose to about $55 per share based on
GIR's earnings. In 1994, however, Rehberg, as the majority shareholder,'
voted to lower the stock's price to $25 per share. 0 7
In September 1994, Lance gave GIR written notice of demand for
records for the purported purpose of assessing the value of his stock.
GIR responded by supplying only some of the requested records and by
claiming that Lance sought certain other of the requested records for an
improper purpose. The trial court ordered GIR to produce most of the
requested records. GIR subsequently appealed, contending the court
erred in some of the factual findings upon which it based its decision."'8
In affirming the trial court's order in large part, the appellate court,
in accordance with Riser v. Genuine Parts Co., 0 9 referred repeatedly
to the trial court's broad discretion in such corporate records-demand
cases. GIR asserted that the trial court erred in finding that the records
were requested for a proper purpose because Lance had become a
competitor of GIR and had filed a number of suits against it. GIR also
argued that Lance made his request to harass GIR.11 The court
rejected GIR's argument and found that the trial court had discretion to
determine if Lance's demand was for the proper purpose of valuing his
stock.1 GIR also argued that the trial court was not bound to the
terms of the Agreement in rendering its decision. Rehberg had testified
that the $49.15 per share stock value set forth in the Agreement was
based on the amount of life insurance proceeds that could be obtained by
the shareholders of GIR, and therefore, the $49.15 per share fair market
value applied only if a shareholder died. The appellate court agreed

106. Id.
107. Id.

108.
109.
110.
111.
187).

Id. at 829-30, 466 S.E.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 830, 466 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Riser, 150 Ga. App. at 505, 258 S.E.2d at 187).
Id.
Id. at 830-31, 466 S.E.2d at 599 (citing Riser, 150 Ga. App. at 505, 258 S.E.2d at
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with the trial court, however, that the Agreement was an integrated
112
contract and that outside considerations could not alter its terms.
GIR also argued that the trial court erred when it required GIR to pay
one-half of the fee Lance paid his accountant to conduct an on-site audit
of certain accounting records customarily used in performing an
audit."' Commenting on the trial court's discretion in determining
what corporate records are relevant to a shareholder's purpose, the
appellate court readily affirmed the trial court's decision to allow Lance's
4
accountant access to the requested records."
GIR realized its only victory on appeal when the appellate court found
that the trial court did not have authority to assess Lance's accountant
fees incurred in the inspection process against GIR."' Under O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-1604(c), if a court orders inspection and copying of the
records demanded, it must also order the corporation to pay the
shareholder's costs (including reasonable attorney fees) incurred to
obtain the order, unless the corporation proves that it had a reasonable
basis to refuse the shareholder's inspection of requested documents." 6
This section did not apply to Lance's accountant fees because the fees
were not incurred by Lance in obtaining the inspection order." 7
F

Dissenter'sRights

The case of Riddle-Bradley, Inc. v. Riddle" stemmed from the sale
of the assets of Riddle-Bradley, Inc. ("Riddle-Bradley") to Danka
Industries, Inc." 9 After the sale, minority shareholders commenced legal
action to exercise their dissenters' rights by demanding that the
Riddle-Bradley and the
Corporation repurchase their shares. 20
dissenters could not agree on the value of shares, and the Corporation
petitioned the court to determine fair value. The lower court entered
summary judgment in favor of the dissenters and awarded them the
amount they demanded from the Corporation because the Corporation
failed to commence a valuation proceeding within the statutory period
without a written extension of time as section 9-11-6(b) of the Civil
Practice Act ("CPA") provides. 2 ' The court of appeals affirmed the

112. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2(1) (1982)).
113. Id. at 831, 466 S.E.2d at 599.

114. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 599-600 (citing Riser, 150 Ga. App. at 505, 258 S.E.2d at 187).
115. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 600.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1604(c) (1994)).
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1604(c) (1994).
217 Ga. App. 725, 459 S.E.2d 576 (1995).
Id. at 725, 459 S.E.2d at 577.
Id. See O.C.GA. §§ 14-2-1301 to -1303 (1994) (dissenters' rights).
217 Ga. App. at 725, 459 S.E.2d at 577. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6(b) (1993).
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lower court's judgment and found that provisions of the CPA allowing
extensions of time in certain circumstances do not apply to periods of
time which are definitely fixed under the dissenter's rights statute.'22
To exercise dissenters' rights, dissenters must demand payment from
the corporation of the estimated fair value of their shares plus accrued
interest.1 " If the corporation and the dissenters are unable to settle
on a value for the shares, the corporation has sixty days after receiving
the dissenters' demand to commence a judicial appraisal proceeding to
determine the fair value of the shares and accrued interest." If the
corporation fails to commence the valuation proceeding within the sixtyday period, then it must pay the amounts set forth in the dissenters'
demand.' 25 The time periods to take action under the dissenter's
rights statute are not flexible. 26
While the CPA applies to appraisal proceedings,' 27 the Georgia Court
of Appeals has held that "'[giranting extensions of time as permitted
under certain circumstances by the Civil Practice Act does not apply' 1to
periods of time which are definitely fixed by other statutes. " 2
Because the time for filing a petition for appraisal is set by statute, the
court of appeals concluded that the CPA did not allow the Corporation
an extension of time to bring the valuation proceeding, whether upon the
consent of the parties or otherwise. 29
G. Drafting Merger Agreements
The court in C & SiSovran Corp. v. First Federal Savings Bank of
Brunswick 30 held that the defendant-bank's termination of a merger
agreement did not relieve it from liability under the agreement. In April
1988, Citizens and Southern Corporation, Citizens and Southern Georgia
Corporation, and Citizens and Southern National Bank (collectively "C
& S"), entered into an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization ("Agreement") with First Federal Savings Bank of Brunswick ("First Federal")
to effect a stock-for-stock merger between C & S and First Federal.' 3 '

122. 217 Ga. App. at 725, 459 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting McClure v. Department of
Transp., 140 Ga. App. 564, 564(1), 231 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1976)).
123. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1330(a) (1994)).
124. Id.

125. Id.
126. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 577-78.
127. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1330(d) (1994)).
128. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting McClure, 140 Ga. App. at 564(1), 231 S.E.2d at

533).
129. Id. at 726, 459 S.E.2d at 578.
130. 266 Ga. 104, 463 S.E.2d 892 (1995).
131. Id. at 104, 463 S.E.2d at 893.
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On September 1, 1990, C & S merged with Sovran Bank Corporation
("Sovran"). After C & S's merger with Sovran, C & S/Sovran Corporation ("C & S/Sovran") was the successor in interest to C & S. C &
S/Sovran and First Federal amended the Agreement and extended the
deadline to consummate the merger to September 30, 1991. When it
appeared that the merger would not be consummated, First Federal filed
suit against C & S/Sovran seeking specific performance of the Agreement
and damages for breach of contract. In October 1991, C & S/Sovran's
Board of Directors voted to terminate the Agreement, and in December
32
1991, C & S/Sovran merged with North Carolina National Bank."
At trial, the jury found that C & S/Sovran had breached the Agreement by failing to timely pursue and file a Y-2 application with the
Federal Reserve Board in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.
The trial court denied C & S/Sovran's motions for judgment on the
verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. C & S/Sovran then
moved for summary judgment on the issues of damages and specific
performance. The trial court granted C & S/Sovran's motion for
summary judgment in part and found that First Federal was entitled to
specific enforcement of the Agreement. The trial court ordered C &
S/Sovran to file the necessary applications with regulatory officials to
effect the merger and to prepare the documents necessary for the
shareholders of First Federal to make an election respecting the merger.
The trial court also ruled that another trial was necessary to determine
the date the merger would have been accomplished if C & S/Sovran had
not breached the Agreement. The court could then determine the
number of shares of C & S/Sovran stock to which the shareholders of
First Federal would have been entitled under the Agreement. C &
S/Sovran appealed from the trial court's denial of its motions for entry
of judgment on the verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and
summary
judgment on First Federal's request for specific perfor133
mance.

On appeal, C & S/Sovran argued that a termination provision in the
Agreement exculpated it from liability for breach of the Agreement. The
Agreement stated in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement ...

and

notwithstanding the approval of [the] Agreement... by the stockholders of [First Federal], this Agreement may be terminated and the
merger abandoned at any time prior to the Effective Date:

132. Id. at 105, 463 S.E.2d at 893.
133. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 893-94.
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By a vote of a majority of the Board of Directors of either C & S/Sovran
or [First Federal] in the event that the merger shall not have been
consummated by September 30, 1991 .... In the event of the termination and abandonment of this Agreement... pursuant to Section 10.1
of this Agreement, this Agreement... shall become void and have no
effect, except that the provisions of (certain] Sections ... of this
Agreement shall survive any such termination and abandonment.3 4
C & S/Sovran argued that because it was entitled to terminate under
the Agreement, upon termination, the Agreement became void and no
contract existed for the trial court to enforce. 13' The Georgia Supreme
Court rejected C & S/Sovran's contention.136
The court recognized that termination provisions are generally
enforceable, but termination provisions which serve as exculpatory
clauses "'must be clear and unambiguous, they must be specific in what
they purport to cover, [with] any ambiguity... construed against the
drafter of the instrument.'"'37 The court found that the termination
provision, which C & S/Sovran drafted, did not apply if a party breached
the contract.1 3 8 Because C & S/Sovran failed to incorporate language
in the termination provision specifically exculpating a party from
liability for breach, C & S/Sovran could not invoke that provision to
relieve itself from such liability and deny First Federal its remedy of
specific performance. 139 The court commented that the Agreement
simply did not permit a party to terminate by delaying consummation
of the merger to avoid the contract; "'a contract [will not] be so construed
as to authorize one of the parties to take advantage of his own wrong,
unless it be plain and manifest that such was the intention of the
parties.' ,,140

C & S/Sovran next contended that the trial court erred in allowing
First Federal a remedy of specific performance of the Agreement. C &
S/Sovran argued that because First Federal's shareholders never
approved the merger, there was never an agreement to merge.14 ' The
court found, however, that the failure of First Federal's shareholders to
approve the merger was excused as a matter of law because C &

134. Id. at 106, 463 S.E.2d at 894.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (quoting Department ofTransp. v. Arapaho Constr., Inc., 257 Ga. 269,270,357
S.E.2d 593, 594 (1987)).
138. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 895.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 106-07, 463 S.E.2d at 895 (quoting Finlay v. Ludden & Bates Southern
Music House, 105 Ga. 264, 267-68, 31 S.E. 180, 181 (1898)).
141. Id. at 107, 463 S.E.2d at 895.
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S/Sovran's breach of the Agreement effectively prevented First Federal
from obtaining shareholder approval. 42
ShareholderDerivative Suits
In Williams v. Service Corp. International,4" the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that filing both direct and derivative claims did not affect
a corporate shareholder's standing as an adequate representative of the
corporation's interests to bring derivative claims against an accounting
firm that handled the corporation's business affairs.'" Plaintiff,
Service Corporation International ("SC"), brought a direct action and a
derivative action on behalf of H.M. Patterson & Son, Inc. ("Patterson")
against Patterson's accountants, Williams, Benjamin, Benator & Libby
and its partners ("WBBL"). After the trial court dismissed SCIs direct
action, the defendants moved to dismiss SCI's derivative action for lack
of standing.' 45 The trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss
the derivative suit, and the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's denial. 4"
SCI held a minority shareholder position in Patterson. The directors
and officers of Allen, Lee Patterson Allen, and the Allen Trust ("Aliens")
owned the remaining shares. In October 1990, SCI filed a derivative
suit against the Allens in Fulton County Superior Court. SCI alleged
various wrongdoings by the Allens, including breach of fiduciary duty,
misappropriation of corporate opportunities, conversion, self-dealing,
negligence, fraud, and conspiracy (the "Allen Action"). Seventeen
months later, SCI moved to add WBBL to the Allen Action, but the court
denied SCIs motion as untimely. In September 1992, SCI responded by
filing direct and derivative actions against WBBL in the DeKalb County
Superior Court. SCI asserted derivative claims against WBBL for
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of agency, breach of contract and
malpractice, and a direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty. SCI also
alleged that WBBL had aided and abetted the Allens. 147
Given the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in Thomas v. Dickson,'"

H.

142. Id.
143. 218 Ga. App. 10, 459 S.E.2d 621 (1995).
144. Id. at 12, 459 S.E.2d at 623.
145. Id. at 10, 459 S.E.2d at 621.

146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id., 459 S.E.2d at 621-22 (citing Thomas v. Dickson, 250 Ga. 772, 301 S.E.2d 49
(1983)). In Thomas, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the general rule that a
shareholder seeking to recover misappropriated corporate funds may only bring a
derivative action. Thomas, 250 Ga. at 774, 301 S.E.2d at 50. However, despite the rule,
the Court in Thomas allowed a minority shareholder of a close corporation to maintain a
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the trial court determined that SCI could not maintain its direct action
against WBBL. After the trial court dismissed SCrs direct action on
these grounds, SCI and the Allens settled the Allen Action. In connection with the settlement, a wholly-owned subsidiary of SCI purchased all
of the Allen's stock in Patterson. Consequently, at the time SCI
appealed the trial court's dismissal of its direct action, SCI and its
wholly-owned subsidiary owned Patterson. In November 1993, WBBL
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss SCI's derivative action. WBBL claimed
that SCI lacked capacity to bring such a claim on Patterson's behalf
did not fairly and adequately represent Patterson's
because SCI
149
interests.

O.C.G.A. section 14-2-741 provides that a shareholder maintaining a
derivative action must have been "'a shareholder of the corporation at
the time of the act or omission complained of. . and [must] '[flairly and
adequately represent the interests of the corporation in enforcing the
rights of the corporation.'"'5 WBBL contended on appeal that SCI did
not fairly and adequately represent Patterson's interests because SCI
filed both direct and derivative actions against WBBL, and because SCI
brought the derivative action and the Allen Action to gain control of
Patterson.'
The appellate court rejected WBBL's argument and
noted that direct and derivative actions may be brought simultaneously.15 Thus, the court rejected the argument that SCI did not fairly
and adequately represent Patterson merely because it simultaneously
filed direct and derivative actions against WBBL.' 5 ' The court also
rejected WBBL's argument that because SCI was involved in the Allen
Action, SCI was not an adequate representative of Patterson."M In
response to WBBL's assertion that SCI brought the Allen Action as a
guise to gain corporate control of Patterson,' the court commented
that SCI filed the Allen Action and the subsequent derivative action as
.

direct action against the majority shareholders for misappropriation of corporate funds
because the plaintiff was the sole injured shareholder and concerns related to multiplicity
of suits, prejudice to other shareholders, and protection of creditors were not implicated.
Id. at 775, 301 S.E.2d at 50. See Paul A. Quir6s & Gregory M. Beil, Business Associations,
47 MERCER L. REV. 41, 55-56 (1995).
149. 218 Ga. App. at 10-11, 459 S.E.2d at 621-22.
150. Id. at 11, 459 S.E.2d at 622 (citing O.C.G.A. § 14-2-741 (1994)).
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Grace Brothers, Ltd. v. Farley Indus., Inc., 264 Ga. 817,450 S.E.2d 814
(1994); C & S Land, Transp. & Dev. Corp. v. Yarbrough, 153 Ga. App. 644, 266 S.E.2d 508
(1980)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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the sole minority shareholder in a closely held corporation whose officers
and directors owned the majority of the shares. 5 The fact that SCIs
interests might have been antagonistic to the Allens' interest did not
mean as a matter of law that SCI's interests were antagonistic to the
corporation itself.'5 7 Absent a showing by WBBL that SCI's interests
were antagonistic to Patterson's interests, the court refused to conclude
that SCI was not an adequate representative of Patterson."

L

Legislative Changes
The 1996 Session of the General Assembly of Georgia yielded several
amendments to the Georgia Business Corporation Code,"" the most
notable of which are summarized below."6
1. Distribution of Rights Exclusion. O.C.G.A. section 14-2-140(6)
amended the definition of "distribution" to exclude the transfer by a
corporation of rights to acquire the company's shares.' 6' Before
amendment, this section excluded only the transfer of a corporation's
shares.'62 The amendment should eliminate directors' concerns about
personal liability for unlawful distributions in connection with rights
offerings if the rights have a substantial market value upon issuance.163

2. Revisions to Indemnification Provisions.
a. Authority of the Board to Indemnify. Former law authorized a
board of directors to indemnify a director if, among other things, the
director acted in a manner "he believed in good faith to be in or not
opposed to the best interests of the corporation."" Under the 1996
amendments, acts taken by a director in his official capacity are now
distinguished from acts not taken in an official capacity. For actions
taken by a director in his official capacity, the standard for indemnification is now whether the director reasonably believed his conduct to be

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id. at 11-12, 459 S.E.2d at 622.
Id., 459 S.E.2d at 622-23.
O.C.G.A. Title 14, Chapter 2.
See 1996 Ga. Laws 1203; 1996 Ga. Laws 352; 1996 Ga. Laws 787.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-140(6) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 14-2-140(6) (1994), amended by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-140(6) (Supp. 1996).

163. October 19, 1995 Letter from William J. Carney on behalf of the Corporate Code
Revision Committee to F. Dean Copeland of the Executive Committee Regarding Proposed
Revisions to the Georgia Business Corporation Code [hereinafter the "Proposed Revisions

Letter"].
164. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851(a) (1994), amended by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-851(a) (Supp. 1996).
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For actions not taken in a
in the best interests of the corporation."
director's official capacity, the standard requires that the director's
conduct be at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporaThe foregoing standard also applies to indemnification for a
tion.'
director's expenses in derivative actions, unless the director received an
improper personal benefit, whether in his official capacity or otherwise. 16

b. Limitations on Mandatory Indemnification. Former O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-852 provided for mandatory indemnification if a director
Now, the director must be "wholly
was successful in an action."
successful" to enjoy mandatory indemnification. 16 9 This amendment
is to avoid a director plea bargaining down to a single count and then
attempting to obtain mandatory indemnification for a sizable portion of
his expenses. 70
c. Board Authority to Authorize Advances. The 1996 amendments
added new subsections to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-853 which now provide
procedural rules for advances. Under section 14-2-853(c), a majority vote
of all disinterested directors, or a majority vote of a committee comprised
of two or more disinterested directors, is required to authorize advances. 17' If there are not at least two disinterested directors, then the
whole board may approve the advances.'72 Alternatively, advances
may be authorized by shareholders, but shares held by interested
directors may not be voted with respect to such authorization.'73
d. Proceduresfor AuthorizingIndemnification. Revisions to O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-855 added another procedure for determining whether
indemnification is proper. If there are less than two disinterested
directors, the board may select special legal counsel to determine
whether indemnification is proper. 7" Further, if the determination is

165. Id. § 14-2-851(a)(2)(A).
166. Id. § 14-2-851(a)(2)(B).
167. Id. § 14-2-851(d).

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. § 14-2-852 (1994), amended by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-852 (Supp. 1996).
Id.
Proposed Revisions Letter, supra note 163.
O.C.G.A. § 14-2-853(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 14-2-853(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 14-2-853(c)(2).
Id. § 14-2-855(2)(B).
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to be made
by the shareholders, interested directors' shares may not be
175
voted.

e. Miscellaneous Changes. Revisions to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-859
expressly authorize contractual obligations to indemnify and provide
that a commitment to indemnify to the maximum extent allowed by law
also includes a commitment to advance expenses. 17 Indemnification
existing at the effective time of a merger survive the
commitments
77
merger.1

3. Resignation and Removal of Officers. Revised O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-843 provides that a copy of a notice of resignation of an
officer, as delivered to a corporation, may be filed with the Secretary of
State.'7 This179amendment responds to a request from the Secretary of
State's office.

4. Board Amendment of Articles of Incorporation. A 1996
amendment revised O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1002 to provide that a board
of directors does not need a shareholder vote to amend the corporation's
articles to delete the name and address of each incorporator and to
delete the mailing address of the initial principal office of the corporation
if an annual registration is on file with the Secretary of State. 80
5. Merger with Other Entities. Amendments to Title 14 of the
O.C.G.A. permit Georgia corporations to merge with foreign or domestic
limited liability companies and nonprofit corporations.'' Former law
allowed Georgia corporations to merge with joint stock associations and
limited partnerships. 8 2 Limited liability companies and limited
partnerships, whether foreign or domestic, may now merge with and into
a Georgia or foreign corporation.'8 "

175. Id. § 14-2-855(b)(3).
176. Id. § 14-2-859(a). A corporation may, however, limit any of the rights to
indemnification or advance for expenses created by or pursuant to Part 5 of Title 14,
Chapter 2. Id. § 14-2-859(c).
177. Id. § 14-2-859(b).
178. Id. § 14-2-843(a).
179. Proposed Revisions Letter, supra note 163.
180. O.C.G.A. § 4-2-1002(4), (5) (Supp. 1996).
181. Id. § 14-2-1109(a)(1), (b).
182. Id. § 14-2-1109(b), amended by O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1109(a)(1), (b) (Supp. 1996).
183. Id. 14-11-901(a) (limited liability companies); Id. § 14-9-206.1(a) (limited
partnerships).
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6. Preservation of Remedies of Dissolved Corporations. Effective July 1, 1996, the dissolution of a corporation in any manner, except
by a decree of the superior court which supervised the liquidation of the
assets or business of the corporation as provided in O.C.G.A. sections 142-1430 through 14-2-1433, does not impair any remedies available to the
dissolved corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders, for any right
or claim existing prior to the dissolution if the action is pending on the
date of dissolution or is commenced within two years of the date of
dissolution.l'"
7. Corporate Tax Changes. Notable changes to Title 48 of the
Official Code of Georgia on Revenue and Taxation provide for additional
authority of the state revenue commissioner to allocate and apportion
corporate net income;"8 5 for various changes with respect to job tax
credits and employee retraining tax credits, sales tax exemptions for
electricity, and primary material handling equipment;18 6 for sales tax
exemptions for the remanufacture of certain aircraft engines, parts, or
components; and for materials
and property used in connection with
18 7
certain federal contracts.
8. Pharmacists May Form Professional Corporations. Revisions to O.C.G.A. section 14-7-2 permit pharmacists to form professional
corporations.'"
II.

PARTNERSHIPS

A. Limited Partner-Maker'sOption to Put Payments on Note for
PartnershipContributionto General Partnernot Valid Defense to
Payment of Note
In Ameritrust Co., N.A. v. White, 8 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a forfeiture clause in a
promissory note prevented the note from qualifying as a negotiable
instrument under Georgia law." The court also held that a subscription agreement for a partnership interest, a promissory note given by the

184. Id. § 14-2-1410.
185. See id. § 48-7-31.

186.
187.
188.
189.

See id. § 48-8-2 to -3.
See id. § 48-7-40.2; Id. § 48-9-2.
Id. § 14-7-2(2) (Supp. 1996).
73 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1996).

190. Id. at 1560.
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subscribing partner to pay for his partnership interest, and an amendment to the partnership agreement granting the subscribing partner a
put option, should be construed together as an integrated contract.19'
However, the exercise of the option to put the note to the general
partner did not relieve the subscribing limited partner from liability on
the note.'92
Plaintiff-appellant Ameritrust Company, N.A. ("Ameritrust") sued
defendant-appellee C.K. White ("White"), the maker of a promissory
note. White gave the note in partial payment of the purchase price for
a limited partner's interest in a limited partnership known as Amberwood Apartments of Bartow County, II, Ltd. ("Amberwood"). Amberwood
was the payee under the note. Amberwood's general partner, Cardinal
Industries, Inc. ("Cardinal"), endorsed the note on behalf of Amberwood
to an affiliate of Cardinal, Cardinal Industries of Georgia Service
Corporation ("CIGSC"). With proper endorsement, CIGSC then pledged
the note to Ameritrust as security for a loan from Ameritrust to
CIGSC.'9
The district court held that White was not liable on the note because
the note was not negotiable and that White had a valid defense to
liability in that he properly exercised an option to put the note to
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
Cardinal.'
district court's finding that the note was not negotiable, but disagreed
that the option to put the note to Cardinal gave White a valid defense
to liability on the note. The court determined that a forfeiture clause in
the note rendered the note nonnegotiable, but that the option to put the
note to Cardinal represented an agreement between White and Cardinal,
and that Cardinal was not a party to the note transaction underlying
The court noted that even if Cardinal were a
Ameritrust's claim."
party to the note transaction through its relationship with CIGSC, White
still could not bring or assert a claim or defense against Cardinal
because the put option agreement would be unenforceable under
O.C.G.A. section 14-9A-47.'96
In 1985, Cardinal, as general partner, formed Amberwood as a Georgia
limited partnership. Its assets consisted primarily of an apartment

191.
192.
193.
194,
195.
196.

Id. at 1558.
Id. at 1560-62.
Id, at 1555.
Id,
Id.
Id.; see infra text accompanying note 235.
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complex. A Cardinal affiliate, Cardinal Industries Development
Corporation ("CIDC"), served as the original limited partner. 97
In 1986, White subscribed to all thirty-five units of limited partnership
interest in Amberwood. White had received a Private Placement
Memorandum ("PPM") for the offering of the partnership units. The
PPM specifically provided that any notes given by investors in payment
of the purchase price for units of limited partnership interest could be
assigned or pledged by Amberwood to CIGSC, and CIGSC could then
pledge the notes to a creditor as security for a loan. In connection with
his subscription for units, White executed a subscription agreement,
power of attorney, and two promissory notes totalling $769,090.'"
Both notes contained a forfeiture clause which provided that White
would lose his interest in Amberwood if he failed to make timely
payments on the note, and that Amberwood would have no obligation to
White for any payments made before forfeiture. As part of the closing
of White's purchase of the units of limited partnership interest, Cardinal
and CIDC revised the Amended Certificate and Agreement of Limited
Partnership to permit White to put to Cardinal certain obligations under
the notes. An amendment to the PPM also detailed the put option.'"
Scheduled payments under the notes were as follows: $176,120 on
June 1, 1987 and $146,440 on June 1, 1988 for the first promissory note,
and $150,780 on June 1, 1989, $153,580 on June 1, 1990, and $142,170
on June 1, 1991 for the second promissory note.2"
The amendment provided that:
(c) The Limited Partner(s) are required to make the 1986 and 1987
payments, and their interest shall vest on a pro-rata basis for said
payments at the time of the 1987 payment. The Limited Partner(s)
have the option to put to CardinalIndustries,Inc. their obligationsfor
each of the years 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991, and in the event the
option to put is exercised in any of these years, Cardinal Industries,
Inc. agrees to purchase for its own account (but may re-sell) that prorata share of the Limited Partnership interest. The option to put must
be exercised in writing by Limited Partner(s) and must be delivered to
Cardinal Industries, Inc. at least forty-five (45) days prior to the June
1 payment date for the year in which it is exercised.
(e) The option to the Limited Partner(s) to put any year's payment to
Cardinal Industries, Inc. must be exercised separately for each of the

197.
198.
199.
200.

73 F.3d at 1555-56.
Id; The total purchase price for White's 35 units was $896,980. Id.
Id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1556.
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of the option, under the terms and conditions set forth hereyears
zo
in.
in201
A Certificate of Amendment to Limited Partnership Agreement of
Amberwood ("Certificate") was filed with the clerks of the appropriate
Georgia courts. The Certificate indicated that CIDC withdrew from the
partnership, that White owned all of the limited partnership units, and
that White contributed $896,980 to the partnership. The Certificate
failed, however, to reference White's put option."2
In July 1987, White made the first payment on the first note. In
September 1987, Cardinal, as general partner, endorsed the two notes
to CIGSC, who in turn endorsed the notes to Ameritrust as security for
a loan.20 White, unaware of the transfer of the notes, paid the second
in full.
installment on the first note which represented 20payment
4
Cardinal forwarded White's payments to Ameritrust.
In February 1989, Amberwood defaulted on a mortgage payment on
partnership property to Crossland Bank ("Crossland"), and Crossland
placed Amberwood in receivership. After White received notice of the
receivership, he immediately decided to exercise his option to put
payments on the second note to Cardinal. By letter dated April 7, 1989,
White put his June 1, 1989 payment to Cardinal and informed Cardinal
to put his 1990 and 1991 payments. All notices
that he also 2intended
05
were proper.
Cardinal filed for bankruptcy in May 1989. In January 1990,
Ameritrust notified White that it held the unpaid second note and that
White should make his 1990 payment to Ameritrust. White disclaimed
liability under the note and asserted Cardinal's responsibility pursuant
to the exercised put option. Ameritrust reviewed the subscription
documents
and discovered the put option as set forth in the amended
2 °6
ppM.
Ameritrust filed an action in December 1990 against White to collect
on the second note. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and
White filed a motion to add a counterclaim against Ameritrust. The
counterclaim alleged that Ameritrust's actions constituted a conspiracy
with Cardinal in the conversion of the notes for Cardinal's benefit and
in a breach of fiduciary duties owed to White and Amberwood by

201.

Id. at 1556-57 (emphasis in original).

202. Id. at 1557.
203. Id. The loan was made to CIGSC, but the proceeds of the loan were deposited in
a Cardinal bank account. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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Cardinal under partnership law and the partnership agreement." 7
The district court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment,
but allowed White's counterclaim. 2°
The district court ruled that the forfeiture clauses in the notes
rendered them nonnegotiable and that Article Three of the Uniform
Commercial Code did not govern, but that Georgia's common law on the
assignment of a contractual right to pay applied. 2" Accordingly,
Ameritrust took the second note subject to any defenses, including the
put option defense that White could assert against the assignors of the
note, Cardinal and CIGSC.210
The district court granted judgment for White on Ameritrust's claim
on the unpaid note, and judgment for Ameritrust on White's counterclaim. 211 Ameritrust argued that the put option could not vary the
terms of the unpaid note. Ameritrust also asserted that pursuant to the
modification clause contained in the note, any changes had to be
attached to the note to be effective.212 The district court found,
however, that all of the subscription documents and instruments,
including the note, constituted one integrated contract, therefore, the put
option was "attached"to the note by virtue of being part of the contract.21 The district court stated that under the integrated contract,
White had a contingent obligation to pay on the note only if he failed to
properly exercise the put option, and that White was not liable on the
second note because he properly exercised his option to put payments
under the note to Cardinal.214 On White's counterclaim, the district
court found21 the evidence insufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy. 1
The court of appeals agreed that the note was not negotiable, but did
not agree that White's exercise of his put option relieved him from
liability.216 Because the forfeiture clause rendered the note nonnegotiable, "Ameritrust did not qualify as a holder in due course ... [and]
took the note subject to White's put option defense and any other
defenses."217 Ameritrust argued on appeal that the district court erred

207.

Id.

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.

211. Id. at 1558.
212. Id.
213.

Id.

214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1560.
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in concluding that the subscription documents and instruments
constituted a single, integrated contract. 218 The appellate court
determined that the subscription materials, including the PPM, the note,
and the put option agreement, constituted one integrated contract and
that the put option agreement did not need to be attached to the note in
accordance with the note's modification clause. 219 The note did not
contain a merger clause providing that the note was the sole and entire
agreement of the parties. A merger clause would have required any
modification to have been attached to be effective. 22 ' Nonetheless, the
appellate court concluded that the district court erred in holding that
White's exercise of his put option released him from liability on the
note.221 The appellate court held that White's put option defense was
not a valid defense against Ameritrust's claim on the note and that
White, after exercising his option, had an obligation to continue to make
payments to Ameritrust on the note.222 The appellate court further
construed the put option agreement to give White a contractual right to
collect from Cardinal, payments made by White under the note after
exercise of the option. 223 However, this did not abrogate White's
liability to Amberwood, or its assignee, under the note because Cardinal
was neither the original obligor nor an assignee. 2 The court's holding
was consistent with Signet Bank v. Weaver,22' a case involving Cardinal and a put option clause identical to the one at issue in Ameritrust.22 8

Amberwood's Certificate indicated White as the sole but

limited partner and indicated that White's contributions to the
partnership totalled $896,980.227 The certificate made no mention of
the put option. 2 1 Under O.C.G.A. section 14-9A-25(b), a certificate of
limited partnership must be amended upon a change in the amount or
character of a limited partner's contribution.229 The court noted that
even if White's defense had been valid, the partnership certificate should
have been amended to account for the put option because the put option

218. Id.

219. Id. at 1561.
220. Id. (distinguishing Kiser v. Godwin, 90 Ga. App. 825, 84 S.E.2d 474 (1954)).
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. at 1563.
Id. at 1562-63.
Id. at 1562.

226.
227.
228.
229.

73 F.3d at 1559-62 nn.7, 8 & 19.
Id. at 1562.
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-25(b)).

Id.
225. No. 4-90-CV-49 (N.D. Ga. May 13, 1991).
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represented a change in the amount and character of his contribution to
the partnership." °
In further support of its holding, the court followed the chain of
assignment of obligations under the note.231 White made the note
payable to Amberwood, which endorsed the note to CIGSC, which in
turn endorsed the note to Ameritrust." 2 Cardinal was outside the
chain of assignment and therefore, could not be liable on the note as an
assignee.2 3 The court added that even if Cardinal had been a party
to the note transaction because of its affiliation with CIGSC, White's
contractual right against Cardinal under the put option agreement
contravened the Georgia Limited Partnership Act and was therefore
unenforceable.2 34 O.C.G.A. section 14-9A-47 deals with withdrawal or
reduction of a partner's contribution and provides:
(a) A limited partner shall not receive from a general partner or
out of partnership property any part of his contribution until:
(1) All liabilities of the partnership, except liabilities to general
partners and to limited partners on account of their contributions, have
been paid or there remains property of the partnership sufficient to pay
them; [and]
(3) The certificate required under Code Section 14-9A-20 is
canceled or so amended as to set forth the withdrawal or reduction.235
Under the put option agreement, White's contractual right against
Cardinal, a general partner, amounted to a right to receive from
Cardinal part of White's contribution to the partnership.23 6 The
application of O.C.G.A. section 14-9A-47 rendered White's contractual
right unenforceable without a showing that all obligations of Amberwood's third party creditors had been satisfied.237 The appellate court
remanded the case to the district court to decide whether the assignment
of the notes was improper.238

230. Id.
231. Id. at 1562-63.
232. Id. at 1562.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1563.

235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-9A-47 (1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1564.
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B. Legislative Changes
See discussion on legislative changes with respect to merger of entities
supra part I(I)(5).
III.

A.

SECURITIES

Securities Arbitration

1. Absent Clear Statement of Intention in Contract to the
Contrary, a Contractual Choice-of-Law Provision May Not
Preclude an ArbitralAward of Punitive Damages that Otherwise
Would Not Be Proper. In Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc.,239 the United States Supreme Court held that a contract between
a securities brokerage firm and its customer permitted an arbitral award
of punitive damages, despite a provision in the parties' agreement that
New York law, under which arbitrators are not authorized to award
punitive damages, would govern.240 In so holding, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgments of the district court and the court of appeals that
disallowed the arbitrators' award of punitive damages. 4 '
Petitioners, Antonio and Diana Mastrobuono, had opened a securities
trading account with the respondent, Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.
("Shearson") by executing Shearson's standard-form client's agreement
(the "Client's Agreement"). The agreement contained an arbitration
clause, and a choice-of-law clause providing for New York law to govern.
In 1989, petitioners sued Shearson in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging that Shearson had
mishandled their account and claiming damages based on a number of
state and federal law theories. Shearson moved to stay the court
proceedings and to compel arbitration pursuant to the rules of the
National Association of Securities Dealers.242 The district court
granted the motion, and a panel of three arbitrators subsequently
awarded $400,000 in punitive damages and $159,327 in compensatory
damages to petitioners. 2 4
Shearson moved to vacate the award of punitive damages because
under New York law, arbitrators lack the authority to award such

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
Id. at 1217-18.
Id. at 1219.
Id. at 1214-15.
Id. at 1215.
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damages.'
Because New York law allows courts, not arbitrators, to
award punitive damages, the district court granted the motion to vacate
the damages award, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.245 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals as to "whether a
contractual choice-of-law provision may preclude an
arbitral award of
4
punitive damages that otherwise would be proper."'
The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district court and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 47 The Supreme Court commented
24
that it has repeatedly held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")
preempts inconsistent state law.249 The real issue, in the Supreme
Court's view, involved whether contractual provisions in an agreement
could preempt the FAA."' Shearson argued that in the Client's
Agreement, the parties could lawfully agree to limit the issues to be
arbitrated and that under such agreement, the petitioner waived any
claim for punitive damages.25 ' In response, the Supreme Court noted
that it had previously held that "the FAA's pro-arbitration policy does
not operate without regard to the wishes of the contracting parties." 52
Further, the Supreme Court commented that its past decisions "make it
clear that if contracting parties agree to include claims for punitive
damages within the issues to be arbitrated, the FAA ensures that their
agreement will be enforced according to its terms even if a rule of state
law would otherwise exclude such claims from arbitration."25

Thus,

in the Supreme Court's view, the case hinged on interpreting the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions of the Client's Agreement to determine
the arbitrability of the petitioner's claim for punitive damages. 2 4
The Client's Agreement included a standard choice-of-law provision
that New York law governed the agreement. Additionally, this
agreement stated that "any controversy" arising out of the transactions

244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976)).

246. Id.
247. Id.
248.

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).

249. 115 S. Ct. at 1215 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265
(1995) (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 211 n.5 (1956)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring))).

250. Id. at 1216.
251. Id. at 1215.
252. Id. at 1216 (citing Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Board of LeLand Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)).
253, Id. (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)).
254. I&
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between Shearson and the petitioner would be settled by arbitration in
accordance with the rules of the National Association of Securities
Dealers ("NASD"), or the Board of Directors of the New York Stock
However, the
Exchange and/or the American Stock Exchange.25
express
reference
to claims for
did
not
contain
any
Client's Agreement
2
punitive damages. "
The Supreme Court stated that in the absence of contractual intent to
exclude punitive damage claims from the agreement to arbitrate, the
FAA would preempt any New York law which rejected an arbitrator's
power to award punitive damages.257 Viewing the choice-of-law
provision in isolation, the Supreme Court concluded that the clause could
be read merely as a substitute for a conflict-of-laws analysis that would
otherwise determine what state's laws would apply to contractual
disputes among the parties.258 Moreover, the Supreme Court noted
that even if a court read the choice-of-law provision as more than a
substitute for ordinary conflict-of-laws analysis, the provision should not
be read so broadly as to make "New York law" mean "New York
decisional law, including that State's allocation of power between courts
and arbitrators, notwithstanding otherwise applicable federal law."25 9
The Supreme Court then examined the arbitration provisions of the
Client's Agreement for a punitive damages exclusion, but could not find
one. 260 Instead, the relevant provision authorized arbitration in
accordance with the NASD's Code of Arbitration Procedure ("NASD
Code").261 The NASD Code does not expressly state that arbitrators
may award punitive damages, but a manual provided to NASD
arbitrators states that "[p]arties to arbitration are informed that
arbitrators can consider punitive damages as a remedy."21 2 Thus, the
relevant provisions in the Client's Agreement, taken together, did not
convince the Supreme Court that the parties contracted to exclude
punitive damages from arbitration.2" This analysis, coupled with
basic tenets of contractual interpretation (i.e., that ambiguous language
should be construed against the drafting party, and that a document
should be read to give effect to all of its provisions and to render them

255. Id. at 1217.
256. Id.
257. Id
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1218.
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting Mastrobruoro v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 20 F.3d 713, 717 (7th
Cir. 1994), reuv'd, 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995)).
263. Id.
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consistent with each other) and the federal policy favoring arbitration,
convinced the Supreme Court to reverse the district court and the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and to hold that a New York choice-oflaw provision did not exclude punitive damages from the arbitration
award.2"
Justice Thomas dissented by questioning the majority's interpretation
of the Client's Agreement in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University.2 65 In Volt, the Supreme Court held that the FAA "simply
requires courts to enforce private contracts to arbitrate as they would
normal contracts-according to their terms."26 Justice Thomas noted
that the holding in Volt led the Supreme Court to enforce a choice-of-law
provision that incorporated a state procedural rule concerning arbitration proceedings. 2 7 He argued that the choice-of-law provision in the
Client's Agreement could not reasonably be distinguished from the
choice-of-law provision in Volt. 21s Moreover, Justice Thomas comment-

ed that the majority's reliance on an NASD manual instead of NASD
rules, was misplaced.269
Regardless of which reasoning is more lucid, this case certainly
highlights the proposition that boilerplate choice-of-law provisions in
contracts containing arbitration provisions should be replaced with
clauses pertaining to the parties' intention regarding the specific issues
to be arbitrated.
2.
Eleventh Circuit Applies Mastrobuono; Due Process
Challenge to Arbitral Award of Punitives Fails. The Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had the opportunity to apply the holding of
Mastrobuono in Davis v. Prudential Securities, Inc.270 The case
reached the Eleventh Circuit on appeal from the confirmation by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida of an
arbitrators' award of punitive damages.2
Citing Mastrobuono,the court dismissed the appellants claim that the
arbitration panel lacked authority under New York law to award
punitive damages to the appellee.272 The court also rejected the

264.
265.
266,
267.

Id. at 1219.
489 U.S. 468 (1989).
115 S. Ct. at 1219 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478).
Id.

268.
269.
270,
271.
272.

Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1221-23.
59 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1187.
Id. at 1188-89.
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appellants due process challenge to the arbitral award of punitive
damages because the state action element of a due process claim is
absent in both the private arbitration of cases and in the confirmation
of arbitration awards by a court.278
3. The Court, Not the Arbitrator, Determines Timeliness of
Claim Under Section 15 of NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,274 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the court, not the arbitrator,
275
determines whether an NASD Code of Arbitration claim is timely.

The claimants, Simon and Judith Cohen ("Cohens"), signed a Customer
Agreement with Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith ("Merrill
Lynch"). The agreement provided for arbitration pursuant to the NASD
Code to resolve any disputes between the Cohens and Merrill Lynch.
The Cohens filed an arbitration claim with the NASD alleging that
Merrill Lynch had defrauded them into making and keeping certain
investments between 1985 and 1991. Particularly, the Cohens asserted
claims for common law fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, gross negligence,
violation of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.277
In response, Merrill Lynch filed suit in Florida state court seeking to
enjoin arbitration on the ground that the Cohens' claims were timebarred under Section 15 of the NASD Code.2 7' The Cohens removed
the case to federal court on grounds of diversity and moved to compel
arbitration.2 ' The district court held that the arbitration panel, not
the court, should determine the question of whether the Cohens' claims
were time-barred. 8" Accordingly, the court granted28 the motion to
compel arbitration and dismissed Merrill Lynch's suit. '

On appeal, Merrill Lynch argued that "section 15 [of the NASD]
Code28 2 is a substantive eligibility requirement relating to the arbitra-

273. Id. at 1191-94.
274. 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995).
275. Id. at 382.
276. Id.
277. Id.

278. Id.
279. Id.

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Section 15 of the NASD Code provides that arbitration claims must be submitted
within six years of "the occurrence" or event giving rise to the act or dispute, claim, or
controversy. The section emphasizes that this limitation does not "extend... statutes of
limitations" and will not apply "to any case which is directed to an arbitrator by a court."
NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 15, reprintedin NASD Manual (CCH) 3715
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bility of claims over six years old."'83 The Cohens countered by
arguing that section 15 is not an eligibility requirement, but rather a
procedural statute of limitations, and its applicability must be determined by the arbitrator."
The court noted a split among the circuits with regard to the issue of
who determines whether a claim is timely under section 15.28' The
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have held that section 15 is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitrability, and as such, the court must
determine whether the claim is timely.28 The Fifth Circuit has held
that section 15 is a procedural requirement to arbitration that must be
determined by the arbitrator.8 7 The Eighth Circuit has also concluded
that the question of timeliness is for the arbitrator, but has based its
determination on section 35 of the NASD Code, which provides that
"[t]he arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and determine the
applicability of all provisions under this Code which interpretation shall
be final and binding on the parties."8 8 In the Eighth Circuit's view,
when parties agree to submit claims to arbitration pursuant to the
NASD Code, their clear intent is to leave the question of arbitrability to
the arbitrators due to section 35.289
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court and
sided with the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits by holding that section
15 of the NASD Code is a substantive eligibility requirement and, as
such, a court must decide if claims are timely under that section. 2, °
The court rejected the Eighth Circuit's section 35 analysis, but quoted
Mastrobuono,29 1 in which the Supreme Court stated that "'due regard
must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities
as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of

(1994).
283. 62 F.3d at 382.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 383.
286. Id. See also PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372 (3d Cir. 1993); Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 651 (6th Cir. 1993); Edward D. Jones & Co.
v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 1992).
287. Id. See also Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir.
1995).
288. 62 F.3d at 383 (citing FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994)).
289. 14 F.3d at 1313. Section 35 grants arbitrators the power "to interpret and
determine the applicability of all provisions" under the NASD Code. This interpretation
will then "be binding upon the parties." NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 35,
reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1 3735 (1994).
290. 62 F.3d at 383.

291.

115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995).
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arbitration.' 2 2 However, the court commented that the Supreme
293
Court recently concluded in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan
that "this presumption in favor of arbitration is not applicable when the
question to be resolved is who decides arbitrability."'
The court
determined that arbitrators are to resolve this question only when there
is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate
the question of arbitrability. 2' The court then held that section 35 of
the NASD Code "is not 'clear and unmistakable evidence' of the parties'
intent to allow the arbitrator to determine the timeliness of the
claim."2 '
B. Investment Advisers: Requirements for Qualificationas Investment Adviser Under the Investment Advisers Act for Application of
the Act's Antifraud Provision
In United States v. Elliott," the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decided a first-impression issue concerning the requirements for
qualification as an investment adviser under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 ("Act").

298

The case stems from the alleged fraudulent acts

of defendants-appellants, Charles Phillip Elliott ("Elliott") and William
H. Melhorn ("Melhorn"), who managed a number of investment
companies including Elliott Real Estate, Inc., Elliott Securities, Elliott
Mortgage Company, Inc., and Elliott Group, Inc. (collectively, "Elliott
Enterprises"). 2
From 1980 to 1987, Elliott owned and served as president of Elliott
Enterprises. During that time Melhorn began as special assistant to
Elliott and later became chief executive officer of Elliott Enterprises.
Although Elliott Securities operated as a securities broker, the rest of
Elliott Enterprises marketed various investment vehicles created and
managed by Elliott Enterprises. Elliott Enterprises lost millions of
dollars each year from 1980 to 1987. Despite these losses, Elliott and
Melhorn kept their investors and attracted new ones by making false

292. 62 F.3d at 384 (quoting Mastrobuono, 112 S. Ct. at 1218 (quoting Volt Info.
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of LeLand Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989))).
293. 115 S. Ct. 1920 (1995).
294. 62 F.3d at 384 (quoting First Options of Chicago, 115 S. Ct. at 1924).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 385. See also Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir.
1992).
297. 62 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1995).
298. Id. at 1306; 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) to -6 (1994).
299. 62 F.3d at 1306.
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claims about the safety and performance of Elliott Enterprises'
investments.3 °
Elliott Enterprises hid its dire financial condition fromits investors by
regularly sending them competitive interest payments. Despite its huge
losses, Elliott Enterprises maintained these interest payments by using
a "Ponzi," or pyramid scheme in which "interest payments were funded
not only by returns from underlying investments, but also by the
principal from newer investor funds."01 Further, ample evidence
showed that both Elliott and Melhorn profited greatly from the illicit
arrangement.0 2
Following an investigation by the SEC in 1987, a receiver took control
of Elliott Enterprises. At that time, liabilities exceeded assets by more
than $20 million. New investors could no longer be attracted, the Ponzi
scheme collapsed, and interest payments ceased. Investors and creditors
of the failed Elliott Enterprises recovered ten-and-a-half cents on the
dollar from- the receiver. 3
Elliott and Melhorn were indicted on twenty-two counts of fraud under
the Act,304 six counts of securities fraud under the Securities Act, 05
ten counts of mail fraud, 3°6 and one count of conspiracy. 0 7 The
charges in the indictment stemmed from misrepresentations allegedly
made by Elliott and Melhorn to nineteen individuals.' s In March
1990, a jury returned a guilty verdict on virtually all the charges.3 9
In July 1990, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida sentenced the defendants to prison terms and ordered them to
make full restitution.3 10

300. Id. For example, Elliott and Melhorn represented to investors that: Elliott
Enterprises was financially sound; Elliott Enterprises was a regulated bank; certain

investments were insured and secured when, in fact, these investments were either backed
by no collateral or insufficient collateral; income from certain investments was tax-free; and
Elliott Enterprises had received clean audit reports from the Florida Department of
Professional Regulation when, in truth, no audits were performed. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1307.
304. Id. Twenty-two counts brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(d) to -6 (1994), and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
305. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
306. Ten counts brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1341 (1994). 62 F.3d at 1307.
307. One count brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). 62 F.3d at 1307.
308. 62 F.3d at 1307. The court noted that its review found only nineteen victims
instead of the twenty-three stated by Melhorn's counsel at sentencing. Id. at 1307 n.2.
309. Id. at 1307.

310. Id.
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Elliott and Melhorn raised a number of issues on appeal. One of the
chief issues was that the evidence was insufficient to support their
convictions for investment-adviser fraud."1 ' Defendants argued that
they were not investment advisers within the meaning of the Act;
therefore, the Act could not apply to their actions.312 Elliott and
Melhorn further contended that even if they served as investment
advisers, there had to be an adviser-client relationship between them
and their victims for the Act's antifraud provisions to apply.3 13
The court first examined whether or not Elliott and Melhorn qualified
as investment advisers for purposes of the Act.31 4 In finding that
defendants were in fact investment advisers, the court looked to Section
80b-2(a)(11) of the Act and stated that an investment adviser is:
[Any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising

others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the
value of securities or as to the advisabilityof investing in, purchasing,
or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular
business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning
securities; but does not include ... (C) any broker or dealer whose
performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his
business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor... ; or (F) such other persons not within the intent of this
paragraph, as the Commission may designate by rules and regulations
or order.31
The court cited an SEC release ("SEC Release") that clarified the
SEC's position on the applicability of the Act to financial planners,
pension consultants, and other financial service providers.316 The
release advises:
Whether a person providing financially related services of the type
discussed in this release is an investment adviser within the meaning
of the Advisers Act depends upon all the relevant facts and circumA determination as to whether a person providing
stances ....
financial planning, pension consulting, or other integrated advisory
services is an investment adviser will depend upon whether such
person: (1) Provides advice, or issues reports or analyses, regarding

311. Id. at 1309.
312. Id. at 1309-11.

313. Id. at 1309, 1311-13.
314. Id. at 1309.

315. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1994)) (emphasis in original).
316. Id. at 1309-10.
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such services; and
securities; (2) is in the business of providing
17
(3) provides such services for compensation.1

The court noted that Elliott and Melhorn clearly gave investment advice
to their customers "both by advising them in their choice among Elliott
Enterprises investment vehicles and by controlling the investments
underlying those investment vehicles."818 The court then turned to the
questions of whether Elliott and Melhorn were "in the business of
advising others" and whether they did so "for compensation. " "'
Again, the court noted that the SEC Release defined the "business"
standard for investment advisers. The SEC Release in pertinent part
provides:
The giving of advice need not constitute the principal business activity
or any particular portion of the business activities of a person in order
for the person to be an investment adviser under section [80b-2(a)(11)].
The giving of advice need only be done on such a basis that it constitutes a business activity occurringwith some regularity .... Whether
a person giving advice about securities would be "in the business" of
doing so, depends upon all relevant facts and circumstances. The staff
considers a person to be "in the business" of providing advice if the
person: (i) Holds himself out as an investment adviser or as one who
provides investment advice, (ii) receives any separate or additional
compensation that represents a clearly definable charge for providing
advice about securities, regardless of whether the compensation is
separate from or included within any overall compensation, or receives
transaction-based compensation if the client implements ... the
investment advice, or (iii) on anything other than rare, isolated and
non-periodic instances, provides specific investment advice.320
The court properly noted that SEC releases are merely highly
persuasive authority, not dispositive. 21 Nevertheless, the evidence
persuaded the court that defendants were in the business of advising
others because they satisfied "all three of the disjunctive factors given
by the SEC." 22 During the relevant period, Elliott was registered with

317. Id. SEC, INVESTMENT ADVISORS AcT RELEASE No. IA-1092, Applicability of
Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension Consultants, and Other Persons
Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a Component of Other Financial Services,
52 Fed. Reg. 38,400, 38,401-02 (1987) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter SEC RELEASE].
318. 62 F.3d at 1310 (citing Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 871 (2d Cir.
1977)).
319. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (1994)).
320. Id. (quoting SEC RELEASE, supra note 317, at 38,402) (emphasis in original).
321. Id. (citing SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir.
1974)).
322. Id.
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the SEC as an investment adviser.3" Further, under 15 U.S.C. § 80b3(d), Melhorn could also be charged under the Act because he acted on
behalf of Elliott, an investment adviser.32 4 The court listed numerous
acts of defendants which placed defendants "in the business of advising
others." For example, defendants distributed letters and brochures
which held them out to the public as registered investment advisers, and
received transaction-based compensation for giving investment advice.

Moreover, defendants regularly gave investment advice.1

Defendants contended that they were not compensated for investment
advice because they did not receive a distinct fee from investors as
payment for investment advice.327 Elliott and Melhorn argued that
investors came to Elliott Enterprises to invest in the company, not to
receive investment advice. 28 However, the court rejected defendants'
contention and stated that "investment advice in this case constitute[d]
a significant [part] of the 'product' sold.""
The court said that
customers relied on defendants to assist them in selecting investments." ° After selection of investments, Elliott and Melhorn continued to advise investors by managing the underlying investments.3 '
The court stated that "[tihe ongoing investment advice and management
provided by Elliott and Melhorn were primary, rather than incidental,
reasons for investing in Elliott Enterprises."332
Additionally, under the SEC Release, it did not matter if Elliott and
Melhorn did not receive a distinct fee for providing investment advice,
because receiving compensation for investment advice does not hinge
upon whether investors are charged a separate fee for the investment
advisory portion of the total services. 333 Thus, "[b]ecause Elliott and
Melhorn [engaged] 'in the business of advising others,' they qualiflied]
33 4
as investment advisers under section 80b-2(a)(11)" of the Act.

Nevertheless, defendants maintained that even if they acted as
investment advisers, they did not have an adviser-client relationship
with any of the investors named in the indictment; therefore, they could

323. Id.
324. Id. at 1310 n.7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1994)).
325. Id. at 1310.
326. Id. at 1310-11.

327. Id.at 1311.
328. Id.
329. Id
330. Id.

331.
332.
333.
334.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311 n.8 (quoting SEC RELEASE,supra note 317, at 38,403).
Id. at 1311.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

not be subject to ,the Act's antifraud provisions. In support of their
proposition that an adviser-client relationship did not exist, Elliott and
Melhorn again argued that they did not receive a separate investment
advisory fee and that no investment adviser contract existed between
them and their customers. 3 5 The court dismissed defendants' contention because subsection 4 of the Act's antifraud provision, section 80b-6,
requires the government to prove only that the defendants acted as
investment advisers and that the defendants "engage[d] in any act,
practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative."3 ' Thus, subsection 4 proscribes certain conduct by
investment advisers, but does not refer to clients or to an adviser-client
relationship.3 37 This reading of section 80b-6, the court commented, is
by the legislative history of the Act and by case law precebolstered
338
dent.
C. "ControllingPerson" Liability Under Section 20(a) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934
The issue before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v.
Enstar Group, Inc.33 9 related to what must be proved to establish
"controlling person" liability under section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "Exchange Act"). The case,
which originated before the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, involved a suit by shareholders of Kinder-Care, Inc.
("KCI") and The Enstar Group, Inc. ("Enstar) 3 40 who bought stock in
Kinder-Care Learning Centers, Inc. ("KCLC") pursuant to the grant to
KCI shareholders of rights to purchase KCLC stock as part of corporate
restructuring. The shareholders alleged material omissions and fraud
in the preparation and dissemination of the prospectus ("Prospectus") for
the rights offering by the founder and former president and chairman of
the board of KCI and former chairman of the board of KCLC, Perry
Mendel ("Mendel").34 1

335. Id.

336. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4) (1994)).
337. Id. at 1311-12.
338. Id. at 1312-13.
339. 84 F.3d 393 (11th Cir.), appealfiled, 65 USLW 3416 (Nov. 25, 1996).
340. 84 F.3d at 395. Kinder-Care, Inc. changed its name to The Enstar Group, Inc.,
following a corporate restructuring. Id. at 394.
341. Id. at 395.
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KCI's attorney prepared the Prospectus. There was no evidence that
Mendel participated in its preparation.' 2
The district court found that Mendel did not commit fraud,343 and
granted summary judgment in favor of Mendel. The court also found no
facts to support a conclusion that Mendel was a controlling person of
KCI at the time of the issuing of the Prospectus. Thus, Mendel could not
be secondarily liable under Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as a
controlling person.
On appeal the appellants conceded that Mendel would be liable for
violations of the Exchange Act only if he were a controlling person
within the meaning of the Exchange Act. 45 Section 20(a) of the
Exchange Act provides that:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as
such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person
is liable ....

"Control" is defined under the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
Exchange Act as "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person."3 47
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that a defendant is a controlling
person. 4 However, the courts of appeals are split on how a plaintiff
meets this burden." 9
The Eighth Circuit's test is the most widely used test for determining
controlling person liability.35 0 That test includes two prongs. The first

prong requires that a plaintiff prove that "the defendant ... actually
participated in (i.e., exercised control over) the operations of the
corporation in general."35 ' The second prong requires a showing that
the defendant possessed the power to control the specific transaction or
activity upon which the primary violation is predicated.3 2 Although

342. Id. at 394.
343. Id. at 395.

344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 395-96 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1994)).
347. Id. at 396 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1996)).

348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. (quoting Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. Metge v. Bankers Trust Co., 474 U.S. 1057 (1986)).
352. Id.
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a number of other circuits had already adopted the Eighth Circuit's test,
the Eleventh Circuit had neither adopted that test, nor formulated its
own, prior to the case at hand." 3
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the controlling person test
devised below by the United States District Court for the Middle District
This test finds a defendant liable as a controlling
of Alabama.3
person under section 20(a) of the Act if the defendant "'had the power
to control the general affairs of the entity primarily liable at the time
the entity violated the securities laws ... [and] had the requisite power
to directly or indirectly control or influence the specific corporate policy
which resulted in the primary liability."'' 355
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the appellate court found
that Mendel was not a controlling person of KCI, and therefore, could
not be secondarily liable for KCI's alleged securities law violations.3 6
The court found no evidence in the trial court record that Mendel had
3 57
any power over KCI at the time of the issuance of the Prospectus.
At the time of the issuance of the Prospectus, Mendel had no role in the
management of KCI. 35" However, the court noted an important
distinction between the Eighth Circuit's test and the Eleventh Circuit's
newly-adopted test.359 The Eighth Circuit's test requires a plaintiff to
prove that a defendant actually exercised power over the entity that was
primarily liable.360 In this case, the Eleventh Circuit did not have to
determine whether "'power to control the general affairs of the entity
primarily liable'" means power to control in the abstract, or the actual
exercise of the power to control, because it held that Mendel neither
possessed nor exercised power to control the affairs of KCI at the time
of issuance of the Prospectus.6 1

353.

Id.

354. Id.
355. Id. (quoting Brown v. Mendel, 864 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 (M.D. Ala. 1994), affd sub
nom. Brown v. Enstar Group, Inc., 84 F.3d 393 (11th Cir. 1996), appeal filed, 65 USLW

3416 (Nov. 25, 1996)).
356. Id. at 397.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 397 n.6.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 397.
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IV. BANKS AND BANKING
A.

Garnishee-BankLiability

This year's survey discusses two garnishment cases involving
garnishee banks which legal counsel should bring to the attention of
bank officers in charge of answering garnishments.
1. Avoiding Liability When Answering Garnishment: Let the
Court Determine Whether Funds Purportedly Held in a Trust,
Escrow or Other Special Account Are Subject to Garnishment. In
Wachovia Bank of Georgia v. Unisys FinancialCorp.,362 the trial court
reminded Georgia banks that when a garnishment action is filed naming
a bank as garnishee and the defendant has accounts denominated as a
trust, escrow, or any other type of special account, the bank should avail
itself of O.C.G.A. section 18-4-82 and allow the court to determine which
funds are subject to garnishment to avoid garnishee liability. O.C.G.A.
section 18-4-82 sets forth the requirements for answering a garnishment. 363 It requires the garnishee to answer the garnishment by
describing what money or other property is subject to garnishment.3
If the garnishee cannot answer, then it must state its inability in its
answer to the garnishment, together with all the facts plainly, fully, and
distinctly set forth to enable the court to determine what assets, if any,
are subject to the garnishment. 5 By leaving the determination of
which assets are subject to the garnishment to the court, a garnishee can
avoid liability for improperly answering a garnishment.3"
Wachovia Bank of Georgia, N.A. ("Wachovia") should have followed the
foregoing approach when it answered a garnishment filed by Unisys
Finance Corporation ("Unisys"). Unisys obtained a judgment against a
collection agency, Hanover Credit Corporation ("Hanover"), and to satisfy
the judgment it filed a garnishment naming Wachovia as garnishee.
Hanover maintained seventeen accounts with Wachovia, but Wachovia
determined that fifteen of the accounts were designated as trust
accounts and therefore, were not subject to garnishment. Wachovia then
answered the garnishment by stating that only funds in one of the two
remaining accounts were subject to the garnishment. Unisys traversed
the answer, claiming it was untrue, and the trial court later found funds

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

221 Ga. App. 471, 471 S.E.2d 554 (1996).
Id. at 473, 471 S.E.2d at 557. See also O.C.G.A. § 18-4-82 (1991).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 18-4-82 (1991)).
Id. at 471, 471 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
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in the other fifteen accounts subject to the garnishment and entered
67
judgment for Unisys. Wachovia appealed the trial court's finding.
Wachovia contended that the trial court erred because the accounts
represented fiduciary accounts containing Hanover's clients' funds which
were exempt from garnishment and argued the sufficiency of its
investigation of the accounts to satisfy its burden under Georgia's
garnishment laws. The Georgia Bankers Association also argued, in an
amicus curiae brief filed with the court, that Wachovia's investigation of
the status of the accounts satisfied garnishment requirements. 3
Upon review of the trial court record, the court of appeals affirmed the
judgment against Wachovia. 69
Wachovia maintained that Hanover opened and maintained the fifteen
accounts at issue for depositing money that Hanover, as a collection
agency, collected for its clients. Wachovia contended that the accounts
represented trust accounts and therefore could not be subject to
garnishment. 870 Although it is generally true that trust accounts are
not subject to garnishment for the trustee's personal debts, 7' the court
3 72
noted that Wachovia's argument assumed the existence of a trust.
The question of the establishment of a trust and the ownership of the
other fifteen accounts represented a question of fact for the trial court
to determine.3 73 Accordingly, the court noted that the trial judge, as
the fact finder, should determine the issue of whether money in the
Wachovia accounts belonged to Hanover or represented trust funds for
4 Reviewing the trial
its clients.
court record, the appeals court found
375
no error.

Evidence presented by Unisys to support its contention that the
accounts represented Hanover's assets and not trust accounts included
resolutions of Hanover's board of directors. The resolutions listed the
accounts and designated Wachovia a depository for the "'funds of
[Hanover].', 3 76 The resolutions did not designate the accounts as trust
accounts.377 Moreover, Unisys presented evidence that, pending the

367. Id.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
Georgia
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id.
Id. at 474, 471 S.E.2d at 558.
Id. at 471-72, 471 S.E.2d at 556.
See Jackson v. Fulton Natl Bank, 46 Ga. App. 253, 167 S.E. 344 (1933).
221 Ga. App. at 472, 471 S.E.2d at 556.
Id. at 473, 471 S.E.2d at 557 (citing Spivey v. Methodist Home of the South
Conference, Inc., 226 Ga. 100, 102, 172 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1970)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472, 471 S.E.2d at 556.
Id.
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garnishment lien, Hanover drew forty-two checks on the fifteen accounts,
which named Hanover as payee.3 78
Wachovia presented the signature cards for the accounts which used
the word "trust" in the account titles, but stipulated that Hanover had
sole discretion of selecting the account titles. Wachovia also received
verbal assurances that the accounts were trust accounts. However,
except for the verbal assurance from Hanover, Wachovia did not perform
any independent investigation to determine the status of the accounts. 7 9 The court of appeals found that the competing evidence
favored Unisys's argument that the accounts were not trust accounts. 38o

By its terms, O.C.G.A. section 18-4-82 sets forth a means for a
garnishee to avoid liability stemming from an answer to a garnishment. 38' Wachovia answered Unisys's garnishment by merely stating
that the sum of $6,262 was subject to garnishment, but gave no
indication of other funds deposited in the name of Hanover which may
or may not have been subject to garnishment.3 2 By answering in this
manner, Wachovia risked a judgment of garnishee liability if its
treatment of Hanover's accounts was erroneous. 8 3 Wachovia's belief
that the accounts represented trust accounts not subject to the garnishment did not relieve the bank from its failure to comply with O.C.G.A.
section 18-4-82. 384 The court advised that Wachovia could have
explained in its answer the basis for doubting ownership of the accounts
and could have thereby avoided liability by presenting the matter to the
The court stated that "Wachovia blindly
court for determination."
relied on the word of its depositor at its own peril.". 8
In his special concurrence to the court's opinion, Judge Johnson
addressed certain concerns presented in the Georgia Bankers Association's amicus curiae brief38 7 The Georgia Bankers Association was
concerned that the court's holding could force Georgia banks to
undertake burdensome independent investigations to determine whether

378. Id.
379. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 557.
380. Id. at 471, 471 S.E.2d at 556.
381. See infra text accompanying notes 390-92.
382. 221 Ga. App. at 475, 471 S.E.2d at 558 (Johnson, J., concurring).
383. Id. at 473, 471 S.E.2d at 557.
384. Id. See also Mobile Paint Mfg. Co. v. Johnston, 219 Ga. App. 299, 300,464 S.E.2d
903, 905 (1995).
385. 221 Ga. App. at 473,471 S.E.2d at 557 (citing Mobile PaintMfg. Co., 219 Ga. App.
at 301, 464 S.E.2d at 905).
386. Id. at 474, 471 S.E.2d at 557-58.
387. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 558 (Johnson, J.,concurring).
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accounts opened' as a trust, escrow, or other special accounts are actually
what the depositors purport them to be."' Judge Johnson attempted
to quell these fears by reinforcing that, upon receipt of a garnishment,
banks are not required to determine whether the funds are in fact held
by customers in a fiduciary capacity.8 9 Judge Johnson cautioned:
But when a garnishment action is filed naming a bank as garnishee,
and the defendant has accounts denominated as a trust or any other
special type of account, the bank should avail itself of the provisions of
O.C.G.A. section 18-4-82 and allow the trial court to determine which
funds are subject to garnishment and thereby avoid liability such. as
that imposed here."
Johnson also emphasized that the majority opinion does not alter the
general rule that trust accounts are not subject to garnishment, nor does
it require banks to undertake burdensome investigations.3 9' The judge
further advised that had Wachovia answered the garnishment by
informing the parties and the court of the existence of the other accounts
and that it could not determine whether the funds in those accounts
were subject to the garnishment, then it would have fulfilled its legal
obligation to answer in accordance with section 18-4-82, and would have
escaped liability altogether.3 92
2. Garnishee-Bank Liability for Failing to Include in Answer
to Garnishment Funds Held by Defendant in "Corporate"
Account. In Mobile Paint Manufacturing Co. v. Johnston,3 9 the
court subjected a garnishee-bank to garnishee liability for failing to
locate and include in its answer funds deposited by the defendant in a
"corporate" account. The court decided that the "corporation" in whose
name the account was opened was not actually incorporated.394 Thus,
the funds in the corporate account were rendered assets of the defendant. Mobile Paint Manufacturing Company, Inc. ("Mobile") obtained a
judgment against Larry A. Johnston ("Johnston"), filed a garnishment
against Johnston for $15,026.23, and named NationsBank of Georgia,
N.A. ("NationsBank") as garnishee. NationsBank answered that it had
only $93.10 of funds subject to Mobile's garnishment. Mobile traversed,
asserting that funds in the NationsBank account of a separate entity,

388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 475, 471 S.E.2d at 558.
Id.
Id.
219 Ga. App. 299, 464 S.E.2d 903 (1995).
Id. at 299, 464 S.E.2d at 904.
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Southeastern Coating, Inc. ("Southeastern"), should alsobe subject to the
garnishment. 395 The court of appeals granted Mobile's application for
discretionary review and reversed the trial court's order denying its
traverse.3 96 The trial court record indicated that Johnston was a vice
president of Southeastern, an unincorporated entity, and was signatory
on Southeastern's account with NationsBank. 97 NationsBank could
not locate Southeastern's corporate resolution,9 which should have
been provided upon opening a corporate account. s
NationsBank argued to both the trial court and the appellate court
that even though Southeastern's account named Johnston as a signatory,
without additional information, it could not locate accounts other than
accounts in Johnston's name to determine whether additional funds held
by the bank were subject to the garnishment."° The trial court found
that although NationsBank may have diverged from its internal
procedures in opening the Southeastern's corporate account, it could not
say that NationsBank erred in doing so.4 °1 The trial court believed
that an "onerous burden" would be placed on garnishee-banks if it held
otherwise.4 °2 The trial court concluded that assuming the Southeastern account had been a valid corporate account, NationsBank would
have lacked authority to freeze the account solely on the basis of
Johnston's signatory authority.4 3
The court of appeals disagreed and found that NationsBank treated
the Southeastern account as a corporate account "at its own peril."4 ,
Garnishment law required NationsBank to describe in its answer the
funds subject to garnishment, and to pay those funds into court. 40 5
Under O.C.G.A. section 18-4-20(b), the garnishment applied to "'[all
debts owed by the garnisheeto the defendant at the time of service of the
summons of garnishment upon the garnishee and all debts accruing from
the garnishee to the defendant from the date of the service to the date
of the garnishee's answer.'"" In the court's view, NationsBank should

395. Id.
396. Id.
397.

Id.

398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Id.
Id.
Id., 464 S.E.2d at 905.
Id.
Id.
Id

404. Id.

405. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 18-4-20, -82 (1991)).
406. Id. at 299-300, 464 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 18-4-20(b)) (emphasis in
original).
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have taken the necessary steps to comply with Georgia's garnishment
laws because garnishment proceedings are "'measured by the strict
terms of the statute."' °7 The court cautioned that "[i]n the case of
corporate accounts, banks should take whatever steps are necessary to
ensure that an account being opened as a corporate account, does indeed
belong to a duly formed corporation."45' The court further commented
that NationsBank's inability to locate the account did not constitute a
In support of this
valid excuse under the garnishment statutes."
proposition, the court cited Citizens & Southern National Bank v.
Plott410 which held that
the fact that the garnishee bank's retrieval system for its account files
failed to disclose to its officer in charge of answering garnishments the
contents of the [other account] does not relieve the bank of its responsibility. Whether or not its retrieval system functions, it is on notice of
the contents of its account files.4
B. Interpretationand Application of the FinancialInstitutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA")
1. Agency Review and Judicial Determination of Claims
Against FDIC Under FIRREA. Aguilar v. FD.I.C."'2 involved the
interpretation and application of the agency review provisions of the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), and judicial determination of claims against the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")."'3 The case involved two separate
appeals that began as a single state court action brought by fourteen
plaintiffs against Southeast Bank ("Southeast"). Before removal to
federal court, the state court entered summary judgment in favor of,
Southeast against eleven of the plaintiffs. This left three plaintiffs to
continue the case.414 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

407. Id. at 300, 464 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting Summer v. Allison, 127 Ga. App. 217,
227(1), 193 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1972)).

408. Id.
409. Id.
410. 135 Ga. App. 778, 218 S.E.2d 901 (1975), reu'd on othergrounds, 236 Ga. 814, 225
S.E.2d 436 (1976).
411. 219 Ga. App. at 300, 464 S.E.2d at 905 (quoting Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank,
135 Ga. App. 778, 778, 218 S.E.2d 901, 902 (1975), rev'd on othergrounds, 236 Ga. 814, 225
S.E.2d 436 (1976)).
412. 63 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1995).
413. Id. at 1061 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(dX6) (1994)).

414. Id.
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the district court
reversed the district court's dismissal because
415
erroneously interpreted 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).
During the pendency of the appeal, Southeast was declared insolvent
and the FDIC was appointed receiver.'" The FDIC removed the case
to federal district court and the plaintiffs moved alternatively to modify
or to vacate the district court's judgment. The FDIC filed alternative
motions for summary judgment or for a stay because plaintiffs could not
maintain their suit until they had exhausted their administrative
remedies before the FDIC.417
Generally, FIRREA does not give the federal courts authority to decide
claims against a financial institution in federal receivership until the
claimant has exhausted its administrative remedies against the
FDIC.418 If a lawsuit against an institution is still pending when the
FDIC is appointed receiver, and if the FDIC timely insists on the use of
its administrative processes, courts will suspend action on the lawsuit.
However, the court would retain jurisdiction as the claimant exhausts
the administrative remedies.41
Section 1821(d)(6)(A) of FIRREA
provides that within sixty days of the date the administrative claim is
denied, or within sixty days of the date on which the 180-day administrative review period expires, the claimant may "'file suit on such claim
(or continue an action commenced before the appointment of the receiver)'" in district court.4 2° A claimant must file suit or continue an

action that was commenced prior to the appointment of a receiver before
the end of the statutory period; otherwise,
the claim is disallowed, and
421
the claimant is foreclosed further relief.
In response to the FDIC's alternative motions for a stay or summary
judgment, the district court issued a stay on the action for 180 days to
allow the plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies against the
FDIC. 2 On June 19, 1992, the FDIC rejected plaintiffs' administrative claim. The 180-day stay expired on July 15, 1992, and on May 11,
1994, the district court dismissed the claim with prejudice on the
grounds that the plaintiffs did not comply with 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).423 According to the district court, the plaintiffs had to take some
action within sixty days after the claim denial in order for the case to

415. Id.
416. Id.

417. Id.
418. Id. (referencing Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1992)).
419. Id.

420. Id. at 1062.
421. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B) (1994)).

422. Id. at 1061.
423. Id.
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proceed.424 The court of appeals disagreed, reversed the district court,
and held that "where the districtcourt entered a stay of definite duration,
claimants need not take affirmative action to 'continue' a suit which was
filed before the appointment of the receiver: the suit goes on when the
425
stay expires.

Under the court's holding, the case becomes active once the definite
stay expires. 426 The court commented that none of the plain language
of section 1821(d)(6) requires an affirmative act in a case like the one
before the court, and that its interpretation was consistent with the
purpose of FIRREA--quick and efficient claims processing. 427 Accordingly, if a claimant fails to exhaust available administrative remedies by
the time a court-ordered stay of definite duration expires, then the FDIC
should assert such failure. Otherwise the suit simply continues.42
2. Right of Receiver or Conservator of Failed Financial
Institution to Repudiate Lease Under FIRREA. In Resolution
Trust Corp. v. United Trust Fund, Inc., 29 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a conservator, as well as a
subsequently-appointed receiver of a failed financial institution, has an
independent right to repudiate a lease under FIRREA, and that the
reasonable period for repudiation begins to run anew with the subsequent appointment. The receiver repudiated the lease at issue within
four months of its appointment,
and the court held that this represented
430
a reasonable time.

United Trust Fund, Inc. ("UTF") bought Pioneer Federal Savings
Bank's ("Old Pioneer's") corporate headquarters in Florida (the
"Property") for $14 million and agreed to lease the Property back to Old
Pioneer for a ten-year period as part of a sale and leaseback transaction.43 ' On February 1, 1990, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")
declared Old Pioneer insolvent and appointed the RTC as its conservator. On March 8, 1990, OTS put Old Pioneer into receivership with the
RTC as receiver, formed a new entity named Pioneer Federal Savings
Bank ("New Pioneer"), and placed New Pioneer into conservatorship with
the RTC as the appointed conservator. Under the receivership,
substantially all of the assets and liabilities of Old Pioneer in receiver-

424. Id.
425. Id. at 1062 (emphasis in original).

426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.

Id.
Id.
Id.
57 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1029-30.
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ship were transferred to New Pioneer and placed in the hands of the
federal conservator. During this period, the RTC, as conservator,
performed its obligations under the lease and decided not to repudiate
the lease in September 1990. On February 28, 1991, the OTS appointed
the RTC as receiver of New Pioneer. RTC then entered into an
agreement with Great Western Bank ("Great Western") whereby Great
Western agreed to purchase some of New Pioneer's assets and assume
certain of its liabilities. The agreement gave Great Western a ninetyday option to assume the lease. After discovering that Great Western
had notified the RTC that Great Western would not exercise its option
to assume the lease, the receiver repudiated the lease effective July 1,
1991 and cited 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) as authority for its repudiation. 2
The litigation focused on this repudiation.""
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1), the RTC, as conservator or receiver, is
entitled to repudiate leases. 4 The timing of the authorized repudiation is governed by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2), which provides that "[t]he
conservator or receiver appointed for any insured depository institution
in accordance with subsection (c) of this section shall determine whether
or not to exercise the rights of repudiation under this subsection within
a reasonable period following such appointment." 43 5 If the RTC, in
accordance with these statutory requirements, repudiates a lease, it is
not liable for damages other than contractual rent through the date of
the repudiation."'
Moreover, the lessor has no claim for damages
under any acceleration clause or under any other penalty provision in
the lease agreement." 7
The lower court found that the RTC, as receiver, did not have a right
independent of its right as the predecessor conservator to repudiate the
lease.43 Consequently, the lower court held that the period of time to
repudiate the lease began on or about March 9, 1990, when the OTS

432. Id. at 1031.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 1032. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) provides that:
In addition to any other rights a conservator or receiver may have, the conservator
or receiver for any insured depository institution may disaffirm or repudiate any
contract or lease-(A) to which such institution is a party; (B) the performance of
which the conservator or receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion,
determines to be burdensome; and (C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which
the conservator or receiver determines, in the conservator's or receiver's discretion,

will promote the orderly administration of the institution's affairs.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (1994).
435. 57 F.3d at 1032 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1994)).
436. Id.

437. Id.
438. Id. at 1034-32.
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appointed the RTC as conservator for New Pioneer, and that the fifteen
and one-half month period between the appointment of the RTC as
conservator on March 9, 1990 and the RTC's repudiation on June 21,
1991 did not represent a reasonable time for repudiation. 43 9 Accordingly, the lower court found that the RTC had defaulted on the
lease.44 °
On appeal, the RTC argued that the lower court erred by misconstruing section 1821(e), and that both the conservator and the receiver had
independent rights under the statute to repudiate the lease within a
reasonable time." 1 The RTC contended that the repudiation occurred
within four months of its appointment as receiver of New Pioneer."2
The court
of appeals agreed with the RTC and reversed the lower
448
court.

The court adopted the reasoning and holding of the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cedar-MinnBuilding Ltd.
44
Partnership.
In that case, the Eighth Circuit held that the plain
language of FIRREA grants an independent right of repudiation to the
RTC both in its capacity as receiver and as conservator of a failed
financial institution. 445 The Eighth Circuit also found that a conservator and receiver have independent reasonable time periods in which to
repudiate.44 Accordingly, the court of appeals refused to find the RTC
liable for breach of the lease because the RTC repudiated in accordance
with the statute." 7
C. New State Banking Laws"'
During the survey period, there were important revisions and
additions made to the state's banking laws, especially in the area of
branch banking. On January 26, 1996, the Georgia General Assembly
repealed and replaced the old Georgia branch banking act with a new

439. Id. at 1032.
440. Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. United Trust Fund, 775 F. Supp. 1465, 1469
(S.D. Fla. 1991), reu'd, 57 F.3d 1025 (11th Cir. 1995)).

441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. at 1036.
444. Id. at 1032-33; Resolution Trust Corp. v. CedarMinn Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 956
F.2d 1446 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 830 (1992).
445. 57 F.3d at 1032 (citing CedarMinn, 956 F.2d at 1450).
446. Id. (citing CedarMinn, 956 F.2d at 1451).
447. Id. at 1032-39.

448. For a discussion of rules adopted by the Georgia Department of Banking and
Finance during the survey period, see Paul A. Quir6s & Gregory M. Beil, Business
Associations, 47 MERCER L. REV. 41, 83-85 (1995).
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branch banking act (the "Intrastate Act"). 9 One of the most notable
changes made by the Intrastate Act is that after July 1, 1996, a bank,
with the prior approval of the Georgia Department of Banking and
Finance ("the Department"), may establish three new or additional
branch banks on a de novo basis and in the same manner currently
provided for the establishment of bank offices under the Georgia
Code."'5 Such branches are not geographically restricted and may be
located anywhere in Georgia.451 Otherwise, the restrictions on the
ability of Georgia banks to form or acquire branch banks that existed
prior to July 1, 1996 continue to apply until July 1, 1998.452
Another major revision of the Intrastate Act allows for future
branching capability. Effective July 1, 1998, the Intrastate Act provides
for the establishment of new or additional branches with the prior
approval of the Department by three different methods: (1) de novo in
the same manner as currently provided for the establishment of bank
offices pursuant to the Georgia Code; (2) by relocation of the parent bank
or another branch bank; or (3) by merger, consolidation, or purchase of
assets and assumption of liabilities involving another parent bank or
branch bank.453
The General Assembly also passed significant legislation in the area
of interstate branch banking by adopting an interstate banking act in
1996 (the "Interstate Act"), 4 " codified as parts 19 and 20 of Article 2,
Chapter 1, Title 7 of the O.C.G.A. The General Assembly expressly
intended for the Interstate Act to place primary consideration on the
protection and promotion of customer convenience, the preservation of
the competitive and other advantages of the dual banking system, and
the proper supervision and regulation of all depository, lending and
financial service providers in the state. 455
Effective April 1, 1996, Part 19 of the Interstate Act includes
comprehensive provisions governing the acquisition of Georgia banks by
out-of-state holding companies, as well as the acquisition of out-of-state
banks by Georgia holding companies.
In addition, the Act sets forth
application, notice, registration and other related requirements.4 57
Part 19 contains a provision prohibiting holding companies from

449. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-600 to -628.15 (Supp. 1996).

450. Id. § 7-1-601(c)(1).
451. Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 7-1-602 (1989).
452. Id. § 7-1-601 (Supp. 1996).
453. Id. § 7-1-601(c)(2), (3).

454.
455.
456.
457.

Id. § 7-1-620 to -628.15 (1989 & Supp. 1996).
Id. § 7-1-628(c) (Supp. 1996).
Id. § 7-1-620.
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acquiring a Georgia bank unless that bank or its predecessor has been
in existence and continously operated or incorporated as a bank for a
period of five years or more prior to the date of acquisition." 8 Another
prohibition included in Part 19 is that no out-of-state holding company
may control thirty percent or more of the amount of deposits of insured
depository institutions in Georgia after consummation of the acquisition.459 This restriction is expressly made subject to any regulations
passed by the Commissioner of Banking and Finance setting forth
waiver procedures whereby the foregoing thirty percent limitation may
be waived upon a showing of good cause.4 Part 19 also sets out two
transactions that do not have to comply with the five year rule or the
thirty percent limitation-provided that the holding company notifies the
Department within thirty days following the consummation of the
transaction.46 ' These transactions include:
(1) The acquisition of a Georgia bank, if such acquisition has been
consummated with assistance from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation under Section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c); [and]
(2) The acquisition of a Georgia bank, if such acquisition has been
consummated in the regular course of securing or collecting a debt
previously contracted in good faith, as provided in and subject to the
requirements of Section 3(a) of the federal Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 ....
462
The General Assembly enacted part 20 of the Interstate Act to allow
interstate banking and branching by merger under Section 102 of the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994
(the "Riegle-Neal Act"), subject to certain limitations and requirements.4' Part 20 becomes effective on June 1, 1997-the same target
date implemented under the Riegle-Neal Act-and covers mergers in
which the resulting bank will have banking locations in Georgia and at
Basically, the resulting bank is the surviving
least one other state.'
entity remaining after the interstate merger transaction. 46 5 In addition, Part 20 provides for certain approval, notice, registration, and other

458. Id. § 7-1-622(bXl).

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

Id. § 7-1-622(bX2)(B).
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Id. § 7-1-623.
Id.
Id. § 7-1-628.
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Id. § 7-1-628.1.
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requirements. 4 6 Part 20 also includes provisions prohibiting the
acquisition of any Georgia bank unless that bank (or any predecessor
bank thereof) has been in existence for at least five years," 7 as well as
a provision forbidding any out-of-state bank from controlling thirty
percent or more of the total amount of deposits held by all insured
Both new provisions are similar to providepository institutions.4
sions found in Part 19.
Part 20 prohibits de novo branching in Georgia by out-of-state banks
The only
by opting out of Section 103 of the Riegle-Neal Act.'
permitted ways for an out-of-state bank to branch into Georgia is if such
bank already has legally established a branch in Georgia and follows the
same procedures and restrictions as Georgia banks, or if the out-of-state'
bank acquires a Georgia bank. v° However, there are restrictions on
an out-of-state bank's capability to purchase and acquire Georgia
This restriction states that unless otherwise expressly
branches.
permitted by Georgia law or regulation, no bank may acquire a branch
or any other bank in Georgia without the acquisition of the entire bank,
unless the acquiring bank could lawfully establish a branch in the
geographic area where the branch to be acquired is located.4 '
A number of other provisions were amended or adopted, but the
foregoing provisions received the most comments from the banking
industry. In addition, during the survey period the Georgia General
Assembly produced significant legislation concerning the Uniform
Commercial Code with respect to Article 3 (Negotiable Instruments) and
Article 4 (Bank Deposits and Collections). 72 The revisions affect
banking and other transactions, and readers are referred to Professor
Sabbath's article beginning on page eighty-three of this issue of the
Annual Survey of Georgia Law for a thorough discussion of these
changes.

466. Id.§ 7-1-628.2.
467. Id. § 7-1-628.3(b).

468. Id. § 7-628.3(a)(2).
469. Id. § 7-1-628.8.
470. Id.

471. Id. § 7-1-628.9.
472. Id. §§ 11-3-101 to -605 & 11-4-101 to -407.

